Introduction to Analytical Accounting Research

Readings

• Economics of Accounting Volume I–Information in Markets and Economics of Accounting Volume II–Performance Evaluation by Peter O. Christensen and Gerald A. Feltham, Springer, (2003) and (2005). This is a two- volume textbook/reference book which covers most of the material in this course
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• Amershi, A. H., R. D. Banker, and S. M. Datar (1990, January). Economic suf- ficiency and statistical sufficiency in the aggregation of accounting signals. The Accounting Review 65(1), 113–130
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• Arya, A., J. Glover, and S. Sunder (1998). Earnings management and the reve- lation principle. Review of Accounting Studies 3(1–2), 7–34
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• Banker, R. D. and S. M. Datar (1989). Sensitivity, precision, and linear ag- gregation of signals for performance evaluation. Journal of Accounting Re- search 27, 21–39
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• Beyer, A., D. A. Cohen, T. Z. Lys, and B. R. Walther (2010). The financial re- porting environment: Review of the recent literature. Journal of Accounting and Economics 50, 296–343
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• Blankespoor, E., E. deHaan, and I. Marinovic (2020). Disclosure processing costs, investors’ information choice,and equity market outcomes: A review. Journal of Accounting and Economics 70(2-3)
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• Christensen, P. O. and G. A. Feltham (2003). Economics of Accounting: Vol- ume I - Information in Markets. Springer Series in Accounting Scholarship. Springer Science+Business Media Inc
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• Christensen, P. O. and G. A. Feltham (2005). Economics of Accounting: Vol- ume II - Performance Evaluation. Springer Series in Accounting Scholar- ship. Springer Science+Business Media Inc
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• Christensen, P. O., G. A. Feltham, and F. S, abac (2003). Dynamic incentives and responsibility accounting: A comment. Journal of Accounting and Eco- nomics 35, 423–436
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• Christensen, P. O., G. A. Feltham, and F. S, abac (2005). A contracting perspec- tive on earnings quality. Journal of Accounting and Economics 39, 265–
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• Christensen, P. O., H. Frimor, and F. S, abac (2013). The stewardship role of analyst forecasts, and discretionary versus non-discretionary accruals. Eu- ropean Accounting Review 22(2), 257–296
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• Christensen, P. O., H. Frimor, and F. S, abac (2020). Real Incentive Effects of Soft Information. Contemporary Accounting Research 37(1), 514–541
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• Christensen, P. O., F. S, abac, and J. Tian (2010). Ranking performance measures in multi-task agencies. The Accounting Review 85(5), 1545–1575
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• Coase, R. H. (1937, November). The nature of the firm. Economica 4(16), 386–
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• Coase, R. H. (1988a, Spring). The nature of the firm: Influence. Journal of
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• Law, Economics, & Organization 4, 33–47
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• Coase, R. H. (1988b, Spring). The nature of the firm: Meaning. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 4(1), 19–32
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• Coase, R. H. (1988c, Spring). The nature of the firm: Origin. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 4(1), 3–17
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• Coase, R. H. (1990). Accounting and the theory of the firm. Journal of Ac- counting and Economics 12, 3–13
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• Datar, S. M., S. C. Kulp, and R. A. Lambert (2001). Balancing performance measures. Journal of Accounting Research 39, 75–92
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• Demski, J. S. (1998, Fall). Performance measure manipulation. Contemporary Accounting Research 15(3), 261–285
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• Dye, R. A. (1983, Autumn). Communication and post-decision information. Journal of Accounting Research 21(2), 514–533
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• Dye, R. A. (1985). Disclosure of nonproprietary information. Journal of Ac- counting Research 23(1), 123–145
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• Dye, R. A. (2001). An evaluation of “essays on disclosure” and the disclosure literature in accounting. Journal of Accounting and Economics 32, 181–
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• Dye, R. A. (2017). Some recent advances in the theory of financial reporting and disclosures. Accounting Horizons 31(3), 39–54
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• Fama, E. F. (1980, April). Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy 88(2), 288–307
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• Feils, D., M. Rahman, and F. S, abac (2018). Corporate governance systems diversity: a coasian perspective on stakeholder rights. Journal of Business Ethics 150(2), 451–466
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• Feltham, G. A. (1968, October). The value of information. The Accounting Review 43(4), 684–696
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• Feltham, G. A. and J. S. Demski (1970, October). The use of models in indfor- mation evaluation. The Accounting Review 45(4), 623–640
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• Feltham, G. A. and M. G. Wu (2000). Public reports, information acquisition by investors, and management incentives. Review of Accounting Studies 5, 155–190
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• Feltham, G. A. and J. Xie (1994). Performance measure congruity and diversity in multi-task principal/agent relations. The Accounting Review 69, 429–
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• Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole (1990). Moral hazard and renegotiation in agency contracts. Econometrica 58, 1279–1319
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• Gibbons, R. and K. J. Murphy (1992). Optimal incentive contracts in the pres- ence of career concerns: Theory and evidence. Journal of Political Econ- omy 100, 468–504
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• Gjesdal, F. (1981, Spring). Accounting for stewardship. Journal of Accounting Research 19(1), 208–231
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• Gjesdal, F. (1982). Information and incentives: The agency information prob- lem. Review of Economic Studies XLIX, 373–390
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• Glover, J. C. (2012). Disclosure and incentives. Accounting Horizons 26(2), 371–380
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• Grossman, S. J. and O. D. Hart (1983). An analysis of the principal-agent prob- lem. Econometrica 51(1), 7–45
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• Hart, O. D. (1988, Spring). Contracts and the theory of the firm. Journal of
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• Law, Economics, & Organization 4(1), 119–139
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• Hermalin, B. E. and M. L. Katz (1991, November). Moral hazard and verifia- bility: The effects of renegotiation in agency. Econometrica 59(6), 1735–
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• Holmström, B. (1999). Managerial incentive problems: A dynamic perspec- tive. Review of Economic Studies 66, 169–182. Holmström, B. and P. Milgrom (1987). Aggregation and linearity in the provi- sion of intertemporal incentives. Econometrica 55, 303–328. Holmström, B. and P. Milgrom (1991). Multitask principal-agent analyses: In- centive contracts, asset ownership, and job design. Journal of Law, Eco- nomics and Organization 7, 24–52
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• Ijiri, Y. (1975). Theory of Accounting Measurement. Sarasota, FL: American Accounting Association
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• Indjejikian, R. and D. Nanda (1999). Dynamic incentives and responsibility accounting. Journal of Accounting and Economics 27, 177–201
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• Innes, R. D. (1990). Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices. Journal of EconomicTheory 52, 45–67
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• Jamal, K. (2012). Dysfunctional consequences of disclosure. Accounting Hori- zons 26(2), 381–383
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• Jensen, M. C. and W. H. Meckling (1976). Theory of the firm:Managerial be- havior, agency costs, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Eco- nomics 3, 305–360
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• Jewitt, I. (1988, September). Justifying the first-order approach to principal- agent problems. Econometrica 56(5), 1177–1190
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• Kim, O. and Y. Suh (1993, January–July). Incentive efficiency of compensation based on accounting and market performance. Journal of Accounting and Economics 16(1–3), 25–53
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• Kim, S. K. (1995). Efficiency of an information system in an agency model. Econometrica 63, 89–102
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• Kim, S. K. and Y. S. Suh (1991). Ranking of accounting information systems for management control. Journal of Accounting Research 29, 386–396
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• Marschak, J. and K. Miyasawa (1968, June). Economic comparability of infor- mation systems. International Economic Review 9(2), 137–174
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• Meyer, M. A. and J. Vickers (1997). Performance comparisons and dynamic incentives. Journal of Political Economy 105(3), 547–581
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• Milgrom, P. R. (1981). Good news and bad news: representation theorems and applications. The Bell Journal of Economics 12(2), 380–391
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• Mirrlees, J. A. (1999, January). The theory of moral hazard and unobservable behaviour: Part I. The Review of Economic Studies 66(1), 3–21. This paper was completed in October 1975 but never previously published (Eds.)
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• North, D. C. (1991). Institutions. Journal of Economic Perspectives 5(1), 97–
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• Paul, J. M. (1992). On the efficiency of stock-based compensation. The Review of Financial Studies 5(3), 471–502
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• Rogerson, W. P. (1985). The first-order approach to principal-agent problems. Econometrica 53, 1357–1368
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• Ross, S. A. (1973, May). The economic theory of agency: The principal’s problem. The American Economic Review 63(2), 134–139. Papers and Pro- ceedings of the Eighty-fifth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association
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• Sloan, R. G. (1993). Accounting earnings and top executive compensation. Journal of Accounting and Economics 16, 55–100
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