Advanced Topics in Analytical Accounting Research

Readings

• Amershi, A. H., R. D. Banker, and S. M. Datar (1990, January). Economic sufficiency and statistical sufficiency in the aggregation of accounting signals. The Accounting Review 65 (1), 113–130
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• Arya, A., J. Glover, and S. Sunder (1998). Earnings management and the revelation principle. Review of Accounting Studies 3 (1–2), 7–34
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• Banker, R. D. and S. M. Datar (1989). Sensitivity, precision, and linear ag- gregation of signals for performance evaluation. Journal of Accounting Research 27, 21–39
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• Christensen, P. O., G. A. Feltham, and F. Şabac (2003). Dynamic incen- tives and responsibility accounting: A comment. Journal of Accounting and Economics 35, 423–436
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• Christensen, P. O., G. A. Feltham, and F. Şabac (2005). A contracting per- spective on earnings quality. Journal of Accounting and Economics 39, 265–294
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• Christensen, P. O., H. Frimor, and F. Şabac (2011a). Earnings quality and earnings management. Working paper, University of Aarhus
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• Christensen, P. O., H. Frimor, and F. Şabac (2011b). The trouble with career concerns and short-term contracts. Working paper, University of Alberta
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• Christensen, P. O., F. Şabac, and J. Tian (2010). Ranking performance measures in multi-task agencies. The Accounting Review 85 (5), 1545–
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• Coase, R. H. (1937, November). The nature of the firm. Economica 4 (16), 386–405
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• Coase, R. H. (1988a, Spring). The nature of the firm: Influence. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 4, 33–47
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• Coase, R. H. (1988b, Spring). The nature of the firm: Meaning. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 4 (1), 19–32
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• Coase, R. H. (1988c, Spring). The nature of the firm: Origin. Journal of
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• Law, Economics, & Organization 4 (1), 3–17
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• Coase, R. H. (1990). Accounting and the theory of the firm. Journal of Accounting and Economics 12, 3–13
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• Datar, S. M., S. C. Kulp, and R. A. Lambert (2001). Balancing perfor- mance measures. Journal of Accounting Research 39, 75–92
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• Demski, J. S. (1998, Fall). Performance measure manipulation. Contem- porary Accounting Research 15 (3), 261–285
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• Dye, R. A. (1983, Autumn). Communication and post-decision informa- tion. Journal of Accounting Research 21 (2), 514–533
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• Fama, E. F. (1980, April). Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy 88 (2), 288–307
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• Feltham, G. A. (1968, October). The value of information. The Accounting Review 43 (4), 684–696
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• Feltham, G. A. and J. S. Demski (1970, October). The use of models in indformation evaluation. The Accounting Review 45 (4), 623–640
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• Feltham, G. A. and M. G. Wu (2000). Public reports, information acqui- sition by investors, and management incentives. Review of Accounting Studies 5, 155–190
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• Feltham, G. A. and J. Xie (1994). Performance measure congruity and diversity in multi-task principal/agent relations. The Accounting Re- view 69, 429–453
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• Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole (1990). Moral hazard and renegotiation in agency contracts. Econometrica 58, 1279–1319
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• Gibbons, R. and K. J. Murphy (1992). Optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career concerns: Theory and evidence. Journal of Political Economy 100, 468–504
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• Gjesdal, F. (1981, Spring). Accounting for stewardship. Journal of Ac- counting Research 19 (1), 208–231
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• Gjesdal, F. (1982). Information and incentives: The agency information problem. Review of Economic Studies XLIX, 373–390
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• Grossman, S. J. and O. D. Hart (1983). An analysis of the principal-agent problem. Econometrica 51 (1), 7–45
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• Hart, O. D. (1988, Spring). Contracts and the theory of the firm. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 4 (1), 119–139
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• Hermalin, B. E. and M. L. Katz (1991, November). Moral hazard and ver- ifiability: The effects of renegotiation in agency. Econometrica 59 (6), 1735–1753. Holmström, B. (1979, Spring). Moral hazard and observability. Bell Jour- nal of Economics 10 (1), 74–91. Holmström, B. (1982, Autumn). Moral hazard in teams. Bell Journal of Economics 13 (2), 324–340
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• Holmström, B. and P. Milgrom (1987). Aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives. Econometrica 55, 303–328. Holmström, B. and P. Milgrom (1991). Multitask principal-agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design. Journal of Law Economics and Organization 7, 24–52
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• Indjejikian, R. and D. Nanda (1999). Dynamic incentives and responsibility accounting. Journal of Accounting and Economics 27, 177–201
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• Innes, R. D. (1990). Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex- ante action choices. Journal of EconomicTheory 52, 45–67
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• Jensen, M. C. and W. H. Meckling (1976). Theory of the firm:Managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305–360
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• Jewitt, I. (1988, September). Justifying the first-order approach to principal-agent problems. Econometrica 56 (5), 1177–1190
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• Kim, O. and Y. Suh (1993, January–July). Incentive efficiency of com- pensation based on accounting and market performance. Journal of Accounting and Economics 16 (1–3), 25–53
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• Kim, S. K. (1995). Efficiency of an information system in an agency model. Econometrica 63, 89–102
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• Kim, S. K. and Y. S. Suh (1991). Ranking of accounting information sys- tems for management control. Journal of Accounting Research 29, 386–
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• Marschak, J. and K. Miyasawa (1968, June). Economic comparability of information systems. International Economic Review 9 (2), 137–174
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• Meyer, M. A. and J. Vickers (1997). Performance comparisons and dy- namic incentives. Journal of Political Economy 105 (3), 547–581
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• Milgrom, P. R. (1981). Good news and bad news: representation theorems and applications. The Bell Journal of Economics 12 (2), 380–391
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• Mirrlees, J. A. (1999, January). The theory of moral hazard and unob- servable behaviour: Part I. The Review of Economic Studies 66 (1),
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• Paul, J. M. (1992). On the efficiency of stock-based compensation. The Review of Financial Studies 5 (3), 471–502
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• Rogerson, W. P. (1985). The first-order approach to principal-agent prob- lems. Econometrica 53, 1357–1368
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• Sloan, R. G. (1993). Accounting earnings and top executive compensation. Journal of Accounting and Economics 16, 55–100
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• Tian, J. J. (2011). Monitoring risky projects. Working paper, University of Alberta
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• Williamson, O. E. (1988a, July). Corporate finance and corporate gover- nance. The Journal of Finance 43 (3), 567–591
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• Williamson, O. E. (1988b, Spring). The logic of economic organization. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 4 (1), 65–93
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