Philosophy of Mind

Chalmers, D. J. (1995). Facing up to the problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2, 200–219

Chalmers, D. J. (2018). The meta-problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 25(9–10), 6–61

Chalmers, D. J. (2020). Debunking arguments for illusionism about consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 27(5–6), 258–281

Chaturvedi, A. (2024). Is the mind a magic trick? Illusionism about consciousness in the “consciousness-only” theory of Vasubandhu and Sthiramati. Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy, 10

Churchland, P. S. (1996). The hornswoggle problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 3, 402–408

Dennett, D. C. (1988). Quining qualia. In A. J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (Eds.), Consciousness in modern science (pp. 42–77). Oxford University Press

Dennett, D. C. (1991). The reality of selves. In Consciousness explained (pp. 412–

Little, Brown

Dennett, D. C. (1998). The practical requirements for making a conscious robot. In Brainchildren: Essays on designing minds (pp. 151–170). Penguin

Dennett, D. C. (2005). The magic of consciousness. In Sweet dreams: Philosophical obstacles to a science of consciousness. MIT Press

Frankish, K. (2016). Illusionism as a theory of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23(11–12), 11–39

Garfield, J. (2017). Illusionism and givenness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23(11–12), 73–82

Kammerer, F. (2018b). How rich is the illusion of consciousness? Erkenntnis, 87(2), 499–515

Kammerer, F. (2021). The illusion of conscious experience. Synthese, 198, 845–

Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? The Philosophical Review, 83, 435–

Noë, A. (2002). Is the visual world a grand illusion? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9(5–6)

Peebles, G. (2024). Eliminativism about phenomenology. Synthese, 484, 275–

Pereboom, D. (2019). Russellian monism, introspective opacity, and the illusion meta-problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 26(9–10), 182–193

Schriner, R. C. (2018). Sceptical alternatives: Strong illusionism versus modest realism. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 25(9–10), 209–227

Bealer, George (1996) “A priori knowledge and the scope of philosophy.” Philosophical Studies 81: 121–142.

Brigandt, Ingo (2013) “A critique of David Chalmers’ and Frank Jackson’s account of concepts.” ProtoSociology 30: 63–88.

Buckwalter, Wesley and Stephen Stich (2014) “Gender and philosophical intuition.” In J. Knobe and S. Nichols (eds.), Experimental Philosophy, Volume 2, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 307–346.

Burgess, Alexis, and David Plunkett (2013) “Conceptual ethics I.” Philosophy Compass 8: 1091– 1101.

Burgess, Alexis, and David Plunkett (2013) “Conceptual ethics II.” Philosophy Compass 8: 1092– 1110.

Chalmers, David J. (1996) The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chalmers, David J (2002) “The components of content.” In D. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 608–633.

Gettier, Edmund L. (1963) “Is justified true belief knowledge?” Analysis 23: 121–123

Haslanger, Sally (2000) “Gender and race: (What) Are they? (What) Do we want them to be?” Noûs 34: 31–55.

Hintikka, Jaakko (1999) “The emperor’s new intuitions.” The Journal of Philosophy 96: 127–147.

Jackson, Frank (1998) From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defense of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jenkins, Katharine (2016) “Amelioration and inclusion: gender identity and the concept of woman.” Ethics 126: 394–421.

Kauppinen, Antti (2007) “The rise and fall of experimental philosophy.” Philosophical Explorations 10: 95–118.

Knobe, Joshua (2007) “Experimental philosophy and philosophical significance.” Philosophical Explorations 10: 119–121.

Knobe, Joshua, and Shaun Nichols (2008) “An experimental philosophy manifesto.” In J. Knobe and S. Nichols (eds.), Experimental Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3–14.

Livengood, Jonathan, and Edouard Machery (2007) “The folk probably don’t think what you think they think: experiments on causation by absence.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31: 107–127.

Ludlow, Peter (2014) “Norms of word meaning litigation.” Protosociology 31: 88–112.

Machery, Edouard (2008) “The folk concept of intentional action: philosophical and experimental issues.” Mind and Language 23: 165–189.

Mallon, Ron (2006) “ ‘Race’: normative, not metaphysical or semantic.” Ethics 116: 525–551.

Mallon, Ron, Edouard Machery, Shaun Nichols, and Stephen Stich (2009) “Against arguments from reference.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79: 332–356.

Nadelhoffer, Thomas (2006) “Bad acts, blameworthy agents, and intentional actions.” Philosophical Explorations 9: 203–219.

Nado, Jennifer (2014) “Philosophical expertise.” Philosophy Compass 9: 631–641.

Nado, Jennifer (2014) “The role of intuition.” In J. Sytsma (ed.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Mind, London: Bloomsbury, 11–43.

Nado, Jennifer (2019) “Conceptual engineering, truth, and efficacy.” Synthese. doi:10.1007/s11229-019- 02096-x

Plunkett, David, and Tim Sundell (2013) “Disagreement and the semantics of normative and evaluative terms.” Philosophers’ Imprint 13: 23.

Putnam, Hilary (1975) “The meaning of ‘meaning’.” In H. Putnam, Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 215–271.

Quine, Willard Van Orman (1953) “Two dogmas of empiricism.” Philosophical Review 60: 20– 43.

Ritchie, Katherine (in review) “Essentializing language and the prospects for ameliorative projects.”

Sarkissian, Hagop, John Park, David Tien, Jennifer Cole Wright and Joshua Knobe (2011) “Folk moral relativism.” Mind & Language 26: 482–505.

Saul, Jennifer (2006) “Gender and race.” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 80: 119–143.

Sosa, Ernest (2005) “A defense of the use of intuitions in philosophy.” In D. Murphy and M. Bishop (eds.), Stich and His Critics, Malden: Blackwell, 101–112.

Stich, Stephen (2005) “Reply to Sosa.” In D. Murphy and M. Bishop (eds.), Stich and His Critics, Malden: Blackwell, 228–237.