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MSFS 6307

Axis of Upheaval

3 Credits · Level: Graduate

Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea are among the United States’ most consequential adversaries. Each poses a distinct challenge to U.S. interests, but increasingly, these countries are not acting alone. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, China, Iran, and North Korea have become critical enablers of Moscow’s war. Iran has provided drones and helped Russia establish their domestic production. North Korea has sent millions of rounds of ammunition, ballistic missiles, and eventually thousands of fighters to support Russia’s war. China, meanwhile, has emerged as Moscow’s most critical lifeline—buying Russian oil and gas, helping Russia circumvent Western sanctions, and providing the technology and components Russia needs not only to sustain but to expand its production of military equipment. Just as important as what Russia has received is what it has given away in return—providing weapons, technology, expertise, and operational experience that are helping its partners boost their own military capabilities. This growing alignment has prompted some analysts to describe Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea as an “Axis of Upheaval.” But how useful is that characterization? These four countries are not formal allies, and their interests do not always coincide. Their relationships are characterized by significant asymmetries, historical mistrust, and important limits on what they are willing to do for one another. Yet they increasingly identify common interests, coordinate their diplomatic and military activities, and share a dissatisfaction with an international system they believe denies them the status and freedom of action they deserve. This course examines the origins, evolution, and implications of this emerging alignment. We will begin with the four leaders—Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, Ali Khamenei, and Kim Jong Un—who have steered their countries into ever closer alignment. Although shaped by very different historical, cultural, and political experiences, each reflects longstanding grievances in his country about its place in the international system and shares a determination to secure greater status and freedom of action. We will then trace the development of cooperation among the four countries before 2022 and examine how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine dramatically accelerated their ties and transformed what they are willing and able to do for one another. The second half of the course widens the aperture beyond Ukraine. We will examine cooperation among the four countries and its implications across the diplomatic, economic, military, and informational domains, focusing on how this cooperation is affecting security in the Middle East, on the Korean Peninsula, and in the Indo-Pacific, as well as how the four countries are engaging with the Global South. In each case, we will assess what their cooperation enables them to accomplish—and where its limits remain. We will also consider how changes in U.S. foreign policy affect their incentives to cooperate and assess the policy tools available to the United States and its allies to respond. Throughout the semester, we will return to three overarching questions: 1. How consequential is the Axis of Upheaval? 2. What difference does their cooperation make? 3. What priority should the United States give to thwarting the Axis? The course concludes by returning to the debate with which it began. Are Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea primarily pursuing transactional relationships driven by overlapping interests and a common adversary, or is their growing alignment becoming a durable feature of international politics? Are they simply united by what they oppose, or are their views about how the international system should operate increasingly converging? Ultimately, students will develop their own assessment of whether the Axis of Upheaval represents a fundamental shift in international order—and whether preventing its further consolidation should become an organizing principle of U.S. foreign policy.

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