Hist and/of Phil of Science

3 Credits · Level: Graduate

The early modern period in philosophy coincides in large measure with important, foundational developments in scientific practice. This course will trace the development of rival approaches to the philosophy of science. We will begin with the precursors to scientific societies found in the late renaissance, and investigate the importance of renaissance medical tryals to the creation of the experimental method. From there we will explore the development of the Royal Society of London and similar organizations during the scientific revolution in the late 17th century, leading to the consolidation of recognizably contemporary science in the so-called second scientific revolution at the end of the 18th century. Of particular interest will be debates over the nature of scientific explanation, the scope of empirical knowledge, and the role of metaphysical speculation in the production of scientific results and in their philosophical appraisal. What we now think of as the “scientific method” is not, first, any readily identifiable single thing. More importantly, what we think of as the practice of science came from somewhere, often by means of acrimonious debate. These debates continue, despite the air of consensus scientists present to the public (and themselves). Here we will cast our gaze back over some of the important episodes that have shaped this fragile consensus, and thereby come to know and appreciate some of its fault lines and possible points of fracture. Possibly we will discover better ways of thinking about the foundations of the sciences. Primary sources include: William Harvey; Francis Bacon; Galileo Galilei; Anne Conway; Rene Descartes; Elisabeth of Bohemia; Katherine Jones; Margaret Cavendish; Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz; Isaac Newton; Robert Boyle; Émilie du Châtelet; William Priestly; David Hume; Antoine Lavoisier. And we will read a bunch of other stuff. Ok, yes, we will also look at some Kant, probably.