Turkey/Russia/Iran: Hot Wars

3 Credits · Level: Graduate

Russia and Iran since at least 2015 have leveraged the Syrian Civil War and unresolved issues stemming from the US-led war in Iraq by repositioning and basing forces along NATO’s southeastern flank. From Syria and Iraq, they used ISIS as a convenient cover story for mounting air, land, and sea operations against US and US-led coalition forces. All sides have carefully avoided defining these kinetic engagements a hot war. The same has rung true of Russia’s invasion of Eastern Ukraine in 2014 and annexation of Crimea in 2015. US and coalition personnel on the front lines from the Black Sea to the Levant, therefore, have confronted Russian and Iranian ordinance without commensurate rules of engagement, authorities, or weapons. Tehran and Moscow have made abundantly clear that they are digging in; they show no signs of withdrawing to their respective borders. Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon, meanwhile, have watched instability grow along their sovereign borders and shorelines as they have welcomed, housed, educated, and cared for millions of refugees who fled war-torn Syria and Iraq. The prolonged humanitarian refugee crises remain unresolved. Turkey's unique geography, military readiness, and counterterrorism experience are three strong reasons the US needs Ankara to play a coordinated and productive role in safeguarding and defending NATO’s southeastern flank from Russia, Iran, and terrorist groups. In a region, however, where “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” is a common strategy, Ankara is exercising a strategic pause – as its Ottoman ancestors did – as a tool to weigh its options. The “Turkish Pause” does not mean inactivity. From 2015 to 2021, Ankara flagrantly flirted with Moscow and Tehran as a means to assess her opportunities; she gauged reactions from Washington and European capitals; and the Turkish government took time to recalculate and announce decisions. As the Young Turks learned in the lead-up to and during WWI and WWII, Turkey has power when its geography is in play. While Turkey joined NATO nearly 70 years ago, US and Brussels need to recognize that they are in an existential head-to-head competition with Russia and Iran. If Washington does not play to win – Moscow and Tehran will extract even more unearned advantages. How did we get here? What defines modern hot wars and terrorism? What constitutes an alliance? How do we regain dominance in a region that 19th century diplomats called “The Eastern Question?” What policies, strategies, and courses of action will reset the shot clock? Five key issues complicate short- and long-term answers to US policy options and engagement strategies with Turkey. Students will explore strategies that aim to address each of them. • First, Turkey has acquired Russian S-400 anti-aircraft missiles that pose direct threats to NATO F-35 and other aircraft as well as other NATO assets and personnel in the region. While this is not the first time Turkey has flirted with Russia - and not the first time the US has closed the door to arms sales - it is the first time NATO has had to confront Russian air, land, and sea forces that are now based in Syria under long-term agreements. • Second, the US decision in the 2010s to train, arm, and advise Syrian-based Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) so that they could help drive ISIS from its “self-proclaimed” caliphate in Raqqa and challenge Bashar al-Assad drew immediate and sustained reactions from Turkey because at least some YPG members were affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). This issue remains largely unresolved, and it is an unrelenting source of high and enduring tension in the region. • Third, while formal US policy supports a unity Iraq, the US has walked a tight rope with Ankara each time the Iraqi Kurdish Regional Government (and its predecessors) has attempted to gain more autonomy or independence from Baghdad (1970, 1991, 2005 and 2017). Sustained US diplomatic, military, and intelligence relations with the IRG have exacerbated mistrust in Ankara. Adding to these turbulent waters are historic and ongoing ties between the PUK and KDP with the PKK and with Iran. • Fourth, the prolonged wars in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, along with instability in Lebanon, have created opportunities for Iran and Hizballah to exert military and sectarian “soft power” influence well beyond its borders. Turkey, home to the last Sunni Caliphate, has complained about growing Shia activism. The broader NATO alliance has struggled to adapt to Iran’s expanding power in the Middle East – and its nuclear weapons ambitions that are accelerating. • Fifth, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has jailed at least 100,000 government employees, journalists, scholars, and protesters who have questioned his policies, corruption, and ruling style. He remains convinced - without credible evidence - that the USG worked behind the scenes with Pennsylvania-based Fethullah Gülen to inspire or support the July 2016 failed coup attempt. The US has not been successful in countering Turkey’s propaganda and harmful narrative on this point in part because of credible analytic judgments that, according to US Ambassador Jim Jeffrey, point clearly to Gülen. This class uses two teaching methods. Before the mid-term, students will learn about key historic events and apply them to current issues that unfold during the semester. After the mid-term paper, students will apply what they have learned while playing assigned roles as the DNI/DCIA or the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury. Students will learn in each role how to write short, cogent, persuasive one-page memos to the President each week. They will gain practice and confidence delivering their written points in short oral briefings as our classroom becomes a simulated White House Situation Room.