Game Theory
Investigates equilibrium and non-equilibrium solution concepts and their foundations as the result of learning or evolution. Studies the equilibria of supermodular games, global games, repeated games, signaling games, and models of bargaining, cheap talk, and reputation.
Spring 2024
This course investigates equilibrium and non-equilibrium solution concepts and their foundations as the result of learning or evolution. Among the topics covered are the equilibria of supermodular games, global games, repeated games, signaling games, and models of bargaining, cheap talk, and reputation.
Readings
- FT chapters 2, 6, and 12
- Aumann, Robert J. “Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies.” Journal of Mathematical Economics 1 (1974), pp. 67–96.
- FT chapters 3, 8, and 11
- MS chapters 7–11
- MS chapters 12–14
- MS chapters 15–17
- Fudenberg, Drew, and David K. Levine. “Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player.” Econometrica 57 (1989), pp. 759–78.
- MS chapter 18
- Deb, Joyee and Jack Fanning. “Reputation and Competitive Selection.” Tech. rep. Working Paper, 2023.
- Horner, Johannes, and Nicolas S. Lambert. “Motivational Ratings” The Review of Economic Studies 88 (2021), pp. 1892–1935.
- Vong, Allen. “Certification for Consistent Quality Provision.” Tech. rep. Working Paper, 2022.
- FT chapter 10
Spring 2016
This course provides a rigorous treatment of non-cooperative solution concepts in game theory, including rationalizability and Nash, sequential, and stable equilibria. It covers topics such as epistemic foundations, higher order beliefs, bargaining, repeated games, reputation, supermodular games, and global games. It also introduces cooperative solution concepts—Nash bargaining solution, core, Shapley value—and develops corresponding non-cooperative foundations.
Readings
- [Game Theory] Chapters 1 and 2.
- Topics: Backwards induction, subgame perfection, iterated conditional dominance · Readings: [Game Theory] Chapter 3.
- [Game Theory] Chapter 8.
- [Game Theory] Chapters 8 and 11.
- [Game Theory] Chapter 5.
- [Game Theory] Chapter 9.
- [Game Theory] Chapter 10.
- Topkis, Donald M. Supermodularity and Complementarity . Princeton University Press, 1998. ISBN: 9780691032443.
- Shapley, Lloyd S. “A Value for n‐Person Games.” In Contributions to the Theory of Games, Vol. II. Edited by H. W. Kuhn and A. W. Tucker. Princeton University Press, 1956.
Prerequisites & course information
Prereq: 14.122 G (Spring) 3-0-9 units
Sources
- Course catalogue ↗2026–2027
- MIT OpenCourseWare ↗Spring 2024
- MIT OCW readings ↗
- MIT OCW syllabus ↗
- MIT OpenCourseWare ↗Spring 2016
- MIT OCW syllabus ↗
- MIT OCW readings ↗
- Historical MIT OpenCourseWare offering. Named reading entries and schedule topics are automatically extracted from the linked source pages.
- Historical MIT OpenCourseWare offering. Named reading entries and schedule topics are automatically extracted from the linked source pages.