Strategy and Information
Covers modern applications of game theory where incomplete information plays an important role. Applications include bargaining, auctions, global games, market design, information design, and network economics. Students taking graduate version complete additional assignments.
Spring 2016
This is an advanced course in game theory. We begin with a rigorous overview of the main equilibrium concepts for non-cooperative games in both static and dynamic settings with either complete or incomplete information. We define and explore properties of iterated strict dominance, rationalizability, Nash equilibrium, subgame perfection, sequential, perfect and proper equilibria, the intuitive criterion, and iterated weak dominance. We discuss applications to auctions, bargaining, and repeated games. Then we introduce solution concepts for cooperative games and study non-cooperative implementations. Other topics include matching theory and networks.
Readings
Prerequisites & course information
Subject meets with 14.161 Prereq: 14.01 or permission of instructor U (Spring) 4-0-8 units. HASS-S
Sources
- Course catalogue ↗2026–2027
- MIT OpenCourseWare ↗Spring 2016
- MIT OCW syllabus ↗
- Historical MIT OpenCourseWare offering. Named reading entries and schedule topics are automatically extracted from the linked source pages.