Industrial Organization I
Covers theoretical and empirical work dealing with the market structure, firm behavior, and consumer outcomes in imperfectly competitive markets. Topics include: monopoly, price discrimination, product differentiation, consumer search, dynamic oligopoly, entry, platforms, auctions, bounded rationality, and online markets. Theoretical and empirical work are integrated in each area.
Fall 2022
14.271 is a PhD-level course in industrial organization, introducing students to the basic building blocks of the field and exposing them to a variety of techniques. It is designed to start the process of preparing economics PhD students to conduct thesis research in the area. It is also intended to be of interest to doctoral students working in other areas of economics and related fields. The course integrates theoretical models and empirical studies.
Readings
- [JT], Chapter 1 (including supplementary section).
- Chevalier, J., Kashyap, A., and Rossi, P. “Why Don’t Prices Rise During Periods of Peak Demand? Evidence from Scanner Data.” American Economic Review 93 (2003): 15–37.
- Spence, A. M. “Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation.” Bell Journal of Economics 6 (1975): 417–429.
- Gul, F., Sonnenschein, H., and Wilson, R. “Foundations of Dynamic Monopoly and the Coase Conjecture.” Journal of Economic Theory 39 (1986): 155–190.
- Fuchs, W., and Skrzypacz, A. “Bargaining with Arrival of New Traders.” American Economic Review 100 (2010): 802–836.
- Board, Simon, and Marek Pycia. “Outside Options and the Failure of the Coase Conjecture.” American Economic Review 104 (2014): 656–671.
- Tirole, Jean. “Sequential Screening with Positive Selection.” Econometrica 84 (2016): 1291–1343.
- Chevalier, J., and Goolsbee, A. “Are Durable Goods Consumers Forward Looking? Evidence from College Textbooks.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 124 (2009): 1853–1884.
- Gentzkow, M., and Shapiro, J. M. “What Drives Media Slant? Evidence from Daily Newspapers.” Econometrica 78 (2010): 35–71.
- Calzolari, G., and Pavan, A. “Monopoly with Resale.” RAND Journal of Economics 37 (2006): 362–375.
- Segal, I. “Optimal Pricing Mechanisms with Unknown Demand.” American Economic Review 93 (2003): 509–529.
- Shapiro, C. “Optimal Pricing of Experience Goods.” Bell Journal of Economics 14 (1983): 497–507.
- Bergemann, D., and Valimaki, J. “Dynamic Pricing of New Experience Goods.” Journal of Political Economy 114 (2006): 713–743.
- Roesler, A., and Szentes, B. “Buyer-Optimal Learning and Monopoly Pricing.” American Economic Review 107 (2017): 2072–2080.
- Bergemann, Dirk, and Stephen Morris. “Information Design.” Journal of Economic Literature 57 (2019): 44–95.
- Armstrong, M. “Recent Developments in the Economics of Price Discrimination.” In Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Ninth World Congress, vol. 2, edited by R. Blundell, W. Newey, and T. Persson, 1–32. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Varian, H. “Price Discrimination.” Chapter 10 in Handbook of Industrial Organization , vol. 1, edited by R. Schmalensee and R. Willig, 593–654. New York: Elsevier, 1989.
- Deneckere, R., and R. P. McAfee. “Damaged Goods.” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 5 (1996): 149–174.
- McAfee, R. P., J. McMillan, and M. Whinston. “Multiproduct Monopoly, Commodity Bundling, and Correlation of Values.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 104 (1989): 371–383.
- Aguirre, I., S. Cowan, and J. Vickers. “Multiproduct Price Discrimination and Demand Curvature.” American Economic Review 100 (2010): 1601–1615.
- Sibley, D., and P. Srinagesh. “Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing with Multiple Taste Characteristics.” RAND Journal of Economics 28 (1997): 684–707.
- Rochet, J.-C., and L. Stole. “Pricing with Random Participation.” Review of Economic Studies 69 (2002): 277–311.
- Fudenberg, D., and J. M. Villas-Boas. “Behavior-Based Price Discrimination and Customer Recognition.” In Handbook on Economics and Information Systems , edited by T. J. Henderschott, 305–328. Elsevier, 2006.
- Fudenberg, D., and J. Tirole. “Upgrades, Trade-ins, and Buybacks.” RAND Journal of Economics 29 (1998): 235–258.
- Courty, P., and H. Li. “Sequential Screening.” Review of Economic Studies 67 (2000): 697–717.
- Shepard, A. “Price Discrimination and Retail Configuration.” Journal of Political Economy 99 (1991): 30–53.
- Graddy, K. “Testing for Imperfect Competition at the Fulton Fish Market.” RAND Journal of Economics 26 (1995): 75–91.
- Scott Morton, F., F. Zettelmeyer, and J. Silva-Risso. “Consumer Information and Price Discrimination: Does the Internet Affect the Pricing of New Cars to Women and Minorities?” Quantitative Marketing and Economics 1 (2003): 65–92.
- Leslie, P. “Price Discrimination in Broadway Theater.” RAND Journal of Economics 35 (2004): 520–541.
- Shiller, B. “Approximating Purchase Propensities and Reservation Prices from Broad Consumer Tracking.” International Economic Review 61 (2020): 847–870.
- Dube, Jean-Pierre, and Sanjog Misra. “Personalized Pricing and Consumer Welfare.” Journal of Political Economy . Forthcoming, 2022.
- Kehoe, Patrick, Bradley Larsen, and Elena Pastorino. “Dynamic Competition in the Era of Big Data.” Hoover Institution Economics Working Paper 22102 (2022).
- McManus, Brian. “Nonlinear Pricing in an Oligopoly Market: The Case of Specialty Coffee.” RAND Journal of Economics 38 (2007): 512–532.
- Luo, Yao, Isabelle Perrigne, and Quang Vuong. “Structural Analysis of Nonlinear Pricing.” Journal of Political Economy 126 (2018): 1341–1376.
- Chu, S., P. Leslie, and A. Sorensen. “Bundle Size Pricing as an Approximation to Mixed Bundling.” American Economic Review 101 (2011): 263–303.
- Sweeting, Andrew. “Price Dynamics in Perishable Goods Markets: The Case of Secondary Markets for Major League Baseball Tickets.” Journal of Political Economy 120 (2012): 1133–1172.
- Bergemann, Dirk, Benjamin Brooks, and Stephen Morris. “The Limits of Price Discrimination.” American Economic Review 105 (2015): 921–957.
- Hidir, Sinem, and Nikhil Vellodi. “Privacy, Personalization, and Price Discrimination.” Journal of the European Economic Association 19 (2021): 1342–1363.
- [JT], Section 2.1 and Chapter 5.
- Vives, X. Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools . Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999.
- Perloff, J., and S. Salop. “Equilibrium with Product Differentiation.” Review of Economic Studies 52 (1983): 107–120.
- Shaked, A., and J. Sutton. “Relaxing Price Competition through Product Differentiation.” Review of Economic Studies 49 (1982): 3–14.
- Weyl, E.G., and M. Fabinger. “Pass-Through as an Economic Tool: Principles of Incidence Under Imperfect Competition.” Journal of Political Economy 121 (2013): 528–583.
- Nocke, V., and N. Schutz. “Multiproduct-Firm Oligopoly: An Aggregative Games Approach.” Econometrica 86 (2018): 523–557.
- Klemperer, P., and M. Meyer. “Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly Under Uncertainty.” Econometrica 57 (1989): 1243–1278.
- Bresnahan, T. “Competition and Collusion in the American Automobile Industry: The 1955 Price War.” Journal of Industrial Economics 35 (1987): 457–482.
- Miller, Nathan, and Matthew Weinberg. “Understanding the Price Effects of the MillerCoors Joint Venture.” Econometrica 85 (2017): 1763–1791.
- Dube, Jean-Pierre, Gunther Hitsch, and Peter Rossi. “Do Switching Costs Make Markets Less Competitive?” Journal of Marketing Research 46 (2009): 435–445.
- Klemperer, P. “The Competitiveness of Markets with Switching Costs.” RAND Journal of Economics 18 (1987): 138–150.
- Handel, B. “Adverse Selection and Inertia in Health Insurance Markets: When Nudging Hurts.” American Economic Review 103 (2013): 2643–2682.
- Bergemann, D., and J. Valimaki. “Learning and Strategic Pricing.” Econometrica 64 (1996): 1125–1149.
- Stole, L. “Price Discrimination in Competitive Environments.” In Handbook of Industrial Organization , vol. 3, edited by M. Armstrong and R. Porter, 1237–1291. Elsevier, 2007.
- Holmes, T. “The Effects of Third-Degree Discrimination in Oligopoly.” American Economic Review 79 (1989): 244–250.
- Ellison, G. “A Model of Add-on Pricing.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 120 (2005): 585–637.
- Corts, K. “Third Degree Price Discrimination in Oligopoly: All-Out Competition and Strategic Commitment.” RAND Journal of Economics 29 (1998): 306–323.
- Fudenberg, D., and J. Tirole. “Customer Poaching and Brand Switching.” RAND Journal of Economics 31 (2000): 634–657.
- Armstrong, M., and J. Vickers. “Competitive Nonlinear Pricing and Bundling.” Review of Economic Studies 77 (2010): 30–60.
- Martimort, D., and L. Stole. “Market Participation in Delegated and Intrinsic Common-Agency Games.” RAND Journal of Economics 40 (2009): 78–102.
- Zhou, Jidong. “Competitive Bundling.” Econometrica 85 (2017): 142–172.
- Adams, B., and K. Williams. “Zone Pricing in Retail Oligopoly.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 11 (2019): 124–156.
- Borenstein, S., and N. Rose. “Competition and Price Dispersion in the U.S. Airline Industry.” Journal of Political Economy 102 (1994): 653–683.
- Busse, M., and M. Rysman. “Competition and Price Discrimination in Yellow Pages Advertising.” RAND Journal of Economics 36 (2005): 378–390.
- Anderson, S. P., André De Palma, and Jacques-François Thisse. Discrete Choice Theory of Product Differentiation . MIT Press, 1992.
- Bajari, Patrick, and C. Lanier Benkard. “Demand Estimation with Heterogeneous Consumers and Unobserved Product Characteristics: A Hedonic Approach.” Journal of Political Economy 113 (2005): 1239–1276.
- Bresnahan, Timothy F. “The Oligopoly Solution Concept Is Identified.” Economics Letters 10 (1982): 87–92.
- Lau, Lawrence J. “On Identifying the Degree of Competitiveness from Industry Price and Output Data.” Economics Letters 10 (1982): 93–99.
- Bresnahan, Timothy F. “Empirical Studies of Industries with Market Power.” In Handbook of Industrial Organization , vol. 2, edited by Richard Schmalensee and Robert D. Willig, 101–195. Elsevier, 1989.
- Deaton, Angus, and John Muellbauer. “An Almost Ideal Demand System.” The American Economic Review 70 (1980): 312–326.
- Ellison, Sara Fisher, Iain Cockburn, Zvi Griliches, and Jerry Hausman. “Characteristics of Demand for Pharmaceutical Products: An Examination of Four Cephalosporins.” RAND Journal of Economics 28 (1997): 426–446.]
- Chaudhuri, Shubha, Pradeep K. Goldberg, and Patrick Jia. “Estimating the Effects of Global Patent Protection in Pharmaceuticals: A Case Study of Quinolones in India.” American Economic Review 96 (2006): 1477–1514.
- Berry, Steven T., James Levinsohn, and Ariel Pakes. “Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium.” Econometrica 63 (1995): 841–890.
- Berry, Steven T., and Philip A. Haile. “Foundations of Demand Estimation.” In Handbook of Industrial Organization , vol. 2, no. 1, 1–62. Elsevier, 2021.
- Berry, Steven T., James Levinsohn, and Ariel Pakes. “Differentiated Products Demand Systems from a Combination of Micro and Macro Data: The New Car Market.” Journal of Political Economy 112 (2004): 68–105.
- Chan, T. Y. “Estimating a Continuous Hedonic-Choice Model with an Application to Demand for Soft Drinks.” RAND Journal of Economics 37 (2006): 466–482.
- Conlon, Christopher, and Jeff Gortmaker. “Best Practices for Differentiated Products Demand Estimation with PyBLP.” RAND Journal of Economics 51, no. 4 (2020): 1108–1161.
- Gentzkow, Matthew A. “Valuing New Goods in a Model with Complementarity: Online Newspapers.” American Economic Review 97 (2007): 713–744.
- Gandhi, Amit, and Aviv Nevo. “Empirical Models of Demand and Supply in Differentiated Products Industries.” In Handbook of Industrial Organization , vol. 4, no. 1, 63–139. Elsevier, 2021.
- Nevo, Aviv. “Measuring Market Power in the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry.” Econometrica 69 (2001): 307–342.
- Nevo, Aviv. “A Practitioner’s Guide to Estimation of Random-Coefficients Logit Models of Demand.” Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 9 (2000): 513–548.
- Petrin, Amil. “Quantifying the Benefits of New Products: The Case of the Minivan.” Journal of Political Economy 110 (2002): 705–729.
- Train, Kenneth E. Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation . Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Varian, H. “A Model of Sales.” American Economic Review 70 (1980): 651–658.
- Stahl, D. “Oligopolistic Pricing with Heterogeneous Consumer Search.” International Journal of Industrial Organization 14 (1996): 243–268.
- Wolinsky, Asher. “Product Differentiation with Imperfect Information.” Review of Economic Studies 51 (1984): 53–61.
- Anderson, Simon, and Regis Renault. “Pricing, Product Diversity and Search Costs: A Bertrand-Chamberlin-Diamond Model.” RAND Journal of Economics 30, no. 4 (1999): 719–735.
- Bar-Isaac, Heski, Guillermo Caruana, and Vicente Cuñat. “Search Design and Market Structure.” American Economic Review 102 (2012): 1140–1160.
- McAfee, R. P. “Multiproduct Equilibrium Price Dispersion.” Journal of Economic Theory 67, no. 1 (1995): 83–105.
- Zhou, Jidong. “Multiproduct Search and the Joint Search Effect.” American Economic Review 104, no. 9 (2014): 2918–2939.
- Rhodes, Andrew. “Multiproduct Retailing.” Review of Economic Studies 82 (2015): 360–390.
- Armstrong, Mark, and Jidong Zhou. “Search Deterrence.” Review of Economic Studies 83 (2016): 26–57.
- Baye, Michael, and John Morgan. “Information Gatekeepers on the Internet and the Competitiveness of Homogeneous Product Markets.” American Economic Review 91, no. 3 (2001): 454–474.
- Sorensen, Alan. “Equilibrium Price Dispersion in Retail Markets for Prescription Drugs.” Journal of Political Economy 108 (2000): 833–850.
- Stango, Victor, and Jonathan Zinman. “Borrowing High versus Borrowing Higher: Price Dispersion and Shopping Behavior in the U.S. Credit Card Market.” Review of Financial Studies 29 (2016): 979–1006.
- Sorensen, Alan. “Price Dispersion and Heterogeneous Consumer Search for Retail Prescription Drugs.” NBER Working Paper 8548 (2001).
- Ellison, Glenn, and Sara Fisher Ellison. “Search, Obfuscation, and Price Elasticities on the Internet.” Econometrica 77, no. 2 (2009): 427–452.
- Ellison, Glenn, and Alexander Wolitzky. “A Search Cost Model of Obfuscation.” RAND Journal of Economics 43, no. 3 (2012): 417–441.
- Wilson, Chris. “Ordered Search and Equilibrium Obfuscation.” International Journal of Industrial Organization 28 (2010): 496–506.
- Genesove, David. “Search and Wholesale Auto Auctions.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 110 (1995): 23–49.
- Hong, Han, and Matthew Shum. “Using Price Distributions to Estimate Search Costs.” RAND Journal of Economics 37, no. 2 (2006): 257–275.
- Hortacsu, Ali, and Chad Syverson. “Product Differentiation, Search Costs, and Competition in the Mutual Fund Industry: A Case Study of the S&P 500 Index Funds.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 119 (2004): 403–456.
- Kim, Jun, Paulo Albuquerque, and Bart Bronnenberg. “Online Demand Under Limited Consumer Search.” Marketing Science 29 (2010): 1001–1023.
- Hortacsu, Ali, Babur De Los Santos, and Matthijs Wildenbeest. “Testing Models of Consumer Search Using Data on Web Browsing and Purchasing Behavior.” American Economic Review 102 (2012): 2955–2980.
- Allen, Jason, Robert Clark, and Jean-Francois Houde. “The Effect of Mergers in Search Markets: Evidence from the Canadian Mortgage Industry.” American Economic Review 104 (2013): 3365–3396.
- Salz, Tobias. “Intermediation and Competition in Search Markets.” Journal of Political Economy 130, no. 2 (2022): 310–345.
- Honka, Elisabeth. “Quantifying Search and Switching Costs in the US Auto Insurance Industry.” RAND Journal of Economics 45 (2014): 847–884.
- Moraga Gonzalez, Jose Luis, Zsolt Sandor, and Matthijs Wildenbeest. “Consumer Search and Prices in the Automobile Market.” Review of Economic Studies (forthcoming, 2022).
- Galenianos, Manolis, and Alessandro Gavazza. “Regulatory Intervention in Consumer Financial Markets: The Case of Credit Cards.” Journal of the European Economic Association (forthcoming, 2022).
- Dinerstein, Michael, Liran Einav, Jonathan Levin, and Neel Sundaresan. “Consumer Price Search and Platform Design in Internet Commerce.” American Economic Review 108 (2018): 1820–1859.
- Coey, Dominic, Bradley Larsen, and Brennan Platt. “Discounts and Deadlines in Consumer Search.” American Economic Review 110 (2020): 3748–3785.
- Farrell, J., and G. Saloner. “Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation.” Rand Journal of Economics 16 (1985): 70–83.
- Katz, M., and C. Shapiro. “Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities.” Journal of Political Economy 94 (1986): 822–841.
- Choi, Jay Pil, Doh Shin Jeon, and Byung Cheol Kim. “Privacy and Personal Data Collection with Information Externalities.” Journal of Public Economics 173 (2019): 113–124.
- Acemoglu, Daron, Ali Makhdoumi, Azarkhsh Malekian, and Asu Ozdaglar. “Too Much Data: Prices and Inefficiencies in Data Markets.” Working paper (2019).
- Innes, Robert, and Richard Sexton. “Customer Coalitions, Monopoly Price Discrimination and Generic Entry Deterrence.” European Economic Review 37 (1993): 1569–1597.
- Pesendorfer, Wolfgang. “Design Innovation and Fashion Cycles.” American Economic Review 85 (1995): 771–792.
- Fudenberg, Drew, and Jean Tirole. “Pricing Under the Threat of Entry by the Sole Supplier of a Network Good.” Journal of Industrial Economics 48 (2000): 373–390.
- Ellison, G., and Drew Fudenberg. “The Neo-Luddite’s Lament: Excessive Upgrades in the Software Industry.” Rand Journal of Economics 31 (Summer 2000): 253–272.
- Rochet, Jean-Charles, and Jean Tirole. “Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets.” Journal of the European Economic Association 1 (2003): 990–1029.
- Tirole, Jean. “Competition and Industrial Challenge for the Digital Age.” Working paper (2020).
- Armstrong, Mark. “Competition in Two-Sided Markets.” Rand Journal of Economics 37 (2006): 668–691.
- Rochet, Jean-Charles, and Jean Tirole. “Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report.” Rand Journal of Economics 37 (Autumn 2006): 645–667.
- Lerner, Joshua, and Jean Tirole. “A Model of Forum Shopping.” American Economic Review 96, no. 4 (2006): 1091–1116.
- Rysman, Mark. “Competition between Networks: A Study of the Market for Yellow Pages.” Review of Economic Studies 71, no. 2 (2004): 483–512.
- Chandra, Ambarish, and Allan Collard-Wexler. “Mergers in Two-Sided Markets: An Application to the Canadian Newspaper Industry.” Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 18 (2009): 1045–1070.
- Fan, Ying. “Ownership Consolidation and Product Characteristics: A Study of the U.S. Daily Newspaper Market.” American Economic Review 103, no. 5 (2013): 1598–1628.
- Jeziorski, Przemyslaw. “Effects of Mergers in Two-Sided Markets: The U.S. Radio Industry.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 6 (2014): 35–73.
- Lee, Robin. “Vertical Integration and Exclusivity in Platform and Two-Sided Markets.” American Economic Review 103, no. 7 (2013): 2960–3000.
- Armstrong, Mark, and Julian Wright. “Two-Sided Markets, Competitive Bottlenecks and Exclusive Contracts.” Economic Theory 32 (2007): 353–380.
- Wang, Chengsi, and Julian Wright. “Search Platforms: Showrooming and Price Parity Clauses.” RAND Journal of Economics 51 (2020): 32–58.
- Choi, Jay Pil, and Doh-Shin Jeon. “A Leverage Theory of Tying in Two-Sided Markets with Nonnegative Price Constraints.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 13 (2021): 283–337.
- Gomes, Renato, and Jean Tirole. “Missed Sales and the Pricing of Ancillary Goods.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 133 (2018): 2097–2169.
- Carlton, Dennis, and Ralph Winter. “Vertical Most-Favored-Nation Restraints and Credit Card No-Surcharge Rules.” Journal of Law and Economics 61 (2018): 215–251.
- Rochet, Jean-Charles, and Jean Tirole. “Cooperation Among Competitors: Some Economics of Payment Card Associations.” RAND Journal of Economics 33 (2002): 549–570.
- [JT], Chapter 6.
- Rotemberg, Julio J., and Garth Saloner. “A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars During Booms.” American Economic Review 76 (1986): 390–407.
- Green, E. J., and R. Porter. “Non-cooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information.” Econometrica 52 (1984): 87–100.
- Abreu, Dilip, David Pearce, and E. Stachetti. “Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring.” Econometrica 58 (1990): 1041–63.
- Athey, Susan, Kyle Bagwell, and Chris Sanchirico. “Collusion and Price Rigidity.” Review of Economic Studies 71 (2004): 317–49.
- Athey, Susan, and Kyle Bagwell. “Optimal Collusion with Private Information.” RAND Journal of Economics 32 (2001): 651–674.
- Harrington, Joseph E. “Cartel Price Dynamics in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority.” RAND Journal of Economics 35 (2004): 651–674.
- Harrington, Joseph E., and Andrzej Skrzypacz. “Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels: Explaining Recent Collusive Practices.” American Economic Review 101 (2011): 1–25.
- Sugaya, Tetsuya, and Ariel Wolitzky. “Maintaining Privacy in Cartels.” Journal of Political Economy 126 (2018): 2569–2607.
- Awaya, Yuichiro, and V. Krishna. “On Communication and Collusion.” American Economic Review 106 (2016): 285–315.
- McCutcheon, Barbara. “Do Meetings in Smoke-Filled Rooms Facilitate Collusion?” Journal of Political Economy 105 (1997): 330–350.
- Borenstein, Severin, and A. Shepard. “Dynamic Pricing in Retail Gasoline Markets.” RAND Journal of Economics 27 (1996): 429–51.
- Porter, Robert H. “A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Economic Committee, 1880–1886.” Bell Journal of Economics 14 (1983): 301–314.
- Ellison, Glenn. “Theories of Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive Committee.” RAND Journal of Economics 25 (1994): 37–57.
- Asker, John, A. Collard Wexler, and Jan De Loecker. “Market Power, Production (Mis)allocation, and OPEC.” American Economic Review 109, no. 4 (2019): 1568–1615.
- Genesove, David, and W. Mullin. “Rules, Communication, and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case.” American Economic Review 91 (2001): 379–398.
- Maskin, Eric, and Jean Tirole. “A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles.” Econometrica 56 (1988): 571–599.
- Noel, Michael. “Edgeworth Price Cycles: Evidence from the Toronto Retail Gasoline Markets.” Journal of Industrial Economics 55 (2007): 69–92.
- Wang, Zhongmin. “Mixed Strategy in Oligopoly Pricing: Evidence from Gasoline Price Cycles Before and Under a Timing Regulation.” Journal of Political Economy 117 (2009): 987–1030.
- Calvano, Emilio, Giacomo Calzolari, Vincenzo Denicolo, and Sergio Pastorello. “Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Pricing, and Collusion.” American Economic Review 110 (2020): 3267–3297.
- Klein, Timo. “Autonomous Algorithmic Collusion: Q-learning Under Sequential Pricing.” RAND Journal of Economics 52 (2021): 538–558.
- Brown, Zach, and Alexander MacKay. “Competition in Pricing Algorithms.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics , forthcoming, 2022.
- Ellison, Sara Fisher, Christopher Snyder, and Hongkai Zhang. “Costs of Managerial Attention and Activity as a Source of Sticky Prices: Structural Estimates from an Online Market.” NBER Working Paper 24680 (2018).
- Asker, John, Chaim Fershtman, and Ariel Pakes. “Artificial Intelligence and Pricing: The Impact of Algorithm Design.” NBER Working Paper 28535 (2021).
- Johnson, Justin, Andrew Rhodes, and Matthijs Wildenbeest. “Platform Design When Sellers Use Pricing Algorithms.” Working Paper (2021).
- Mankiw, N.G., and M. Whinston. “Free Entry and Social Inefficiency.” RAND Journal of Economics 17 (1986): 48–58.
- Sutton, J. Sunk Costs and Market Structure . MIT Press, 1991. Chapters 1–2.
- Jovanovic, B. “Selection and the Evolution of Industry.” Econometrica 50 (1982): 649–670.
- Vellodi, Nikhil. “Ratings Design and Barriers to Entry.” Working paper (2021).
- Bresnahan, T., and P. Reiss. “Entry and Competition in Concentrated Markets.” Journal of Political Economy 99 (1991): 977–1009.
- Berry, S., and J. Waldfogel. “Free Entry and Social Inefficiency in Radio Broadcasting.” RAND Journal of Economics 30 (Autumn 1999): 397–420.
- Dunne, T., M. Roberts, and L. Samuelson. “Patterns of Firm Entry and Exit in U.S. Manufacturing.” RAND Journal of Economics 19 (Winter 1988): 495–515.
- Golder, P., and G. Tellis. “Pioneer Advantage: Marketing Logic or Marketing Legend.” Journal of Marketing Research 30 (993): 158–170.
- Bronnenberg, B., S. Dhar, and J.-P. Dube. “Brand History, Geography, and the Persistence of Brand Shares.” Journal of Political Economy 117 (2009): 2472–2508.
- Bronnenberg, Bart, Jean-Pierre Dube, and Matthew Gentzkow. “The Evolution of Brand Preferences: Evidence from Consumer Migration.” American Economic Review 102 (2012): 2472–2508.
- Foster, Lucia, John Haltiwanger, and Chad Syversion. “The Slow Growth of New Plants: Learning About Demand.” Econometrica 83 (2016): 91–129.
- Berry, S., A. Eizenberg, and J. Waldfogel. “Optimal Product Variety in Radio Markets.” RAND Journal of Economics 47 (Fall 2016): 463–497.
- [JT], pp. 207–8, Chapter 8.
- Mas-Colell, Andreu, Michael D. Whinston, and Jerry R. Green. Microeconomic Theory . Chapter 12, Appendix B.
- Bulow, J., John Geanakoplos, and Paul Klemperer. “Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements.” Journal of Political Economy 93 (1985): 488–511.
- Fudenberg, Drew, and Jean Tirole. “The Fat Cat Effect, the Puppy Dog Ploy, and the Lean-and-Hungry Look.” American Economic Review 74 (1984): 361–366.
- Dixit, Avinash K. “The Role of Investment in Entry Deterrence.” Economic Journal 90 (1980): 721–729.
- Schmalensee, Richard. “Entry Deterrence in the Ready-to-Eat Breakfast Cereal Industry.” Bell Journal of Economics 9 (1978): 305–327.
- Judd, Kenneth L. “Credible Spatial Preemption.” Rand Journal of Economics 16 (1985): 153–166.
- Aghion, Philippe, and Patrick Bolton. “Entry Prevention Through Contracts with Customers.” American Economic Review 77 (1987): 388–401.
- Whinston, Michael D. “Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion.” American Economic Review 80 (1990): 837–859.
- Milgrom, Paul, and John Roberts. “Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis.” Econometrica 50 (1982): 443–459.
- Fudenberg, Drew, and Jean Tirole. “A Signal Jamming Theory of Predation.” Rand Journal of Economics 17 (1986): 366–376.
- Chevalier, Judith. “Capital Structure and Product Market Competition: Empirical Evidence from the Supermarket Industry.” American Economic Review 85 (1995): 415–435.
- Goolsbee, Austan, and Chad Syverson. “How Do Incumbents React to the Threat of Entry? The Case of Major Airlines.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 123 (2008): 1611–1633.
- Ellison, G., and S. F. Ellison. “Strategic Entry Deterrence and the Behavior of Pharmaceutical Incumbents Prior to Patent Expiration.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 3 (2011): 1–36.
- Sweeting, Andrew, James Roberts, and Chris Gedge. “A Model of Dynamic Limit Pricing with an Application to the Airline Industry.” Journal of Political Economy 123 (2020): 1148–1193.
- Smiley, R. “Empirical Evidence on Strategic Entry Deterrence.” International Journal of Industrial Organization 6 (1988): 167–180.
- Zheng, Fanyin. “Spatial Competition and Preemptive Entry in the Discount Retail Industry.” Columbia Working Paper (2016).
- Cunningham, Colleen, Florian Ederer, and Song Ma. “Killer Acquisitions.” Journal of Political Economy (2022).
- Ryan, Stephen. “The Costs of Environmental Regulation in a Concentrated Industry.” Econometrica 80 (2012): 1019–1061.
- Pakes, Ariel, and Paul McGuire. “Computing Markov Perfect Equilibrium: Numerical Implications of a Dynamic Differentiated Product Model.” Rand Journal of Economics 25 (1994): 555–589.
- Pakes, Ariel, and Robert Ericson. “Markov Perfect Industry Dynamics: A Framework for Empirical Work.” Review of Economic Studies 62 (1995): 53–82.
- Besanko, David, Ulrich Doraszelski, Yannis Kryukov, and Mark Satterthwaite. “Learning-by-Doing, Organizational Forgetting, and Industry Dynamics.” Econometrica 78 (2010): 453–508.
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Prerequisites & course information
Prereq: None. Coreq: 14.122 and 14.381 G (Fall) 5-0-7 units
Sources
- Course catalogue ↗2026–2027
- MIT OpenCourseWare ↗Fall 2022
- MIT OCW calendar ↗
- MIT OCW syllabus ↗
- MIT OCW readings ↗
- Historical MIT OpenCourseWare offering. Named reading entries and schedule topics are automatically extracted from the linked source pages.