14.282
Introduction to Organizational Economics
Begins with survey of contract theory for organizational economists, then introduces the main areas of the field, including the boundary of the firm; decision-making, employment, structures and processes in organizations; and organizations other than firms.
Spring 2009 · Organizational Economics
Topics
- Introduction
- Classic evidence
- Formal theories
- Recent evidence
- Contracting between firms
- Evidence on contracts
- Cases on integration and contracts
- Pay for performance
- Cases on incentives
- Job assignment, skill development, and networks
- Careers in organizations
- Employment systems
- Decision processes
- Authority and power
- Politics and influence
- Culture and language
- Social relations
- Leadership
- Five elemental models of hierarchy
- Cases on organizational structures and processes
- Recent models of structure
- Conglomerates and corporate strategy
- Hybrids
- Corporate governance and corporate capital
- Conclusion
Readings
- Required readings include cases marked by (C) and those denoted by an asterisk (*) symbol. The readings marked by (H) are draft chapters from the following:
- Gibbons, R., and J. Roberts, eds. The Handbook of Organizational Economics . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, forthcoming.
- *Coase, Ronald. “The Nature of the Firm.” Economica 4 (1937): 386-405.
- *Williamson, Oliver. “The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations.” American Economic Review 61 (1971): 112-123.
- *Alchian, Armen, and Harold Demsetz. “Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization.” American Economic Review 62 (1972): 316-325.
- *Klein, Benjamin, Robert Crawford, and Armen Alchian. “Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process.” Journal of Law and Economics 21 (1978): 297-326.
- Williamson, Oliver. “Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations.” Journal of Law and Economics 22 (1979): 233-261.
- (H) Baker, George. “Clinical Papers in Organizational Economics.” In The Handbook of Organizational Economics . Edited by R. Gibbons and J. Roberts. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, forthcoming.
- *Monteverde, Kirk, and David Teece. “Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the Automobile Industry.” Bell Journal of Economics 13 (1982): 206-212.
- *Masten, Scott. “The Organization of Production: Evidence from the Aerospace Industry.” Journal of Law and Economics 27 (1984): 403-417.
- *Joskow, Paul. “Vertical Integration and Long-Term Contracts: The Case of Coal-Burning Electric Generation Plants.” Journal of Law Economics and Organizations 1 (1985): 33-80.
- Macher, Jeffrey, and Barak Richman. “Transaction Cost Economics: An Assessment of Empirical Research in the Social Sciences.” Business and Politics 10 (2008): 1-63.
- *Grossman, Sanford, and Oliver Hart. “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration.” Journal of Political Economy 94, no. 2 (1986): 691-719.
- Hart, Oliver. Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure . Oxford, United Kingdom: Clarendon Press, 1995, chapter 2. ISBN: 9780198288817.
- Whinston, Michael. “On the Transaction Cost Determinants of Vertical Integration.” Journal of Law Economics and Organizations 19 (2003): 1-23.
- Holmstrom, Bengt, and Paul Milgrom. “The Firm as an Incentive System.” American Economic Review 84, no. 4 (1994): 972-991.
- *Holmstrom, Bengt. “The Firm as a Subeconomy.” Journal of Law Economics and Organizations 15 (1999): 74-102.
- *Simon, Herbert. “A Formal Theory Model of the Employment Relationship.” Econometrica 19 (1951): 293-305.
- Williamson, Oliver. Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications . New York, NY: Free Press, 1983. ISBN: 9780029347805.
- (H) Tadelis, Steven, and Oliver Williamson. “Transaction Cost Economics.” In The Handbook of Organizational Economics . Edited by R. Gibbons and J. Roberts. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, forthcoming.
- (H) Segal, Ilya, and Michael Whinston. “Property Rights.” In The Handbook of Organizational Economics . Edited by R. Gibbons and J. Roberts. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, forthcoming.
- Baker, George, and Thomas Hubbard. “Make Versus Buy in Trucking: Asset Ownership, Job Design, and Information.” American Economic Review 93 (2003): 551-572.
- Azoulay, Pierre. “Capturing Knowledge Within and Across Firm Boundaries: Evidence from Clinical Development.” American Economic Review 94, no. 5 (2004): 1591-1612.
- Forbes, Silke, and Mara Lederman. “Adaptation and Vertical Integration in the Airline Industry.” Unpublished manuscript, University of California, San Diego, 2008.
- ———. “Does Vertical Integration Affect Firm Performance? Evidence from the Airline Industry.” Unpublished manuscript, University of Toronto, 2008.
- (H) Bresnahan, Timothy, and Jonathan Levin. “Vertical Integration and Market Structure.” In The Handbook of Organizational Economics . Edited by R. Gibbons and J. Roberts. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009, forthcoming.
- Aghion, Philippe, and Jean Tirole. “On the Management of Innovation.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 109 (1994): 1185-1207.
- *Bajari, Patrick, and Steven Tadelis. “Incentives Versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts.” RAND Journal of Economics 32 (2001): 287-307.
- Macaulay, Stewart. “Non Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study.” American Sociological Review 28 (1963): 55-67.
- Macneil, Ian. “Contracts: Adjustments of Long-term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law.” Northwestern University Law Review 192 (1978): 854-906.
- Klein, Benjamin, and Kevin M. Murphy. “Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms.” Journal of Law and Economics 31 (1988): 265-297.
- ———. “Vertical Integration as a Self-Enforcing Contractual Arrangement.” American Economic Review 87 (1997): 415-420.
- Klein, Benjamin. “The Role of Incomplete Contracts in Self-Enforcing Relationships.” Revue D’Économie Industrielle 92 (2000): 67-80.
- (H) Malcomson, James. “Relational Incentive Contracts.” In The Handbook of Organizational Economics . Edited by R. Gibbons and J. Roberts. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, forthcoming.
- *Lerner, Josh, and Robert Merges. “The Control of Technology Alliances: An Empirical Analysis of the Biotechnology Industry.” Journal of Industrial Economics 46 (1998): 125-156.
- McMillan, John, and Christopher Woodruff. “Dispute Prevention Without Courts in Vietnam.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 15 (1999): 637-658.
- *Arruñada, Benito, Luis Garicano, and Luis Vázquez. “Contractual Allocation of Decision Rights and Incentives: The Case of Automobile Distribution.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 17 (2001): 257-284.
- Elfenbein, Daniel, and Josh Lerner. “Ownership and Control Rights in Internet Portal Alliances, 1995-1999.” RAND Journal of Economics 34 (2003): 356-369.
- *Corts, Kenneth, and Jasjit Singh. “The Effect of Repeated Interaction on Contract Choice: Evidence from Offshore Drilling.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 20 (2004): 230-260.
- Gil, Ricard, and Justin Marion. “The Role of Repeated Interactions, Self-Enforcing Agreements and Relational [Sub]Contracting: Evidence from California Highway Procurement Auctions.” Unpublished manuscript, University of California, Santa Cruz, 2009.
- (H) Lafontaine, Francine, and Margaret Slade. “Inter-Firm Contracts: Evidence.” In The Handbook of Organizational Economics . Edited by R. Gibbons and J. Roberts. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, forthcoming.
- (C) Weber, Katherine Seger, and Linda Hill. “Rudi Gassner and the Executive Committee of BMG International (A).” Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Case #9-494-055, 1995.
- (C) Hunt, Brian, and Josh Lerner. “Xerox Technology Ventures: March 1995.” Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Case #9-295-127, 1998.
- (C) Freeze, Karen, and Gary Pisano. “Crown Equipment Corporation: Design Services Strategy.” Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Case #9-991-031, 1991.
- (C) Dyer, Jeffrey. “How Chrysler Created an American Keiretsu.” Harvard Business Review (July-August 1996): 32-46.
- Lazear, Edward. “Performance Pay and Productivity.” American Economic Review 90 (2000): 1346-1361.
- (H) Baron, James, and David Kreps. “Employment as an Economic and a Social Relationship.” In The Handbook of Organizational Economics . Edited by R. Gibbons and J. Roberts. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, forthcoming.
- Baker, George. “Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement.” Journal of Political Economy 100, no. 3 (1992): 598-614.
- ———. “Distortion and Risk in Optimal Incentive Contracts.” Journal of Human Resources 37, no. 4 (2002): 728-751.
- *Courty, Pascal, and Gerald Marschke. “An Empirical Investigation of Gaming Responses to Explicit Performance Incentives.” Journal of Labor Economics 22 (2004): 23-56.
- Larkin, Ian. “The Cost of High-Powered Incentives: Employee Gaming in Enterprise Software Sales.” Unpublished manuscript, Harvard Business School, 2007.
- *Baker, George, Robert Gibbons, and Kevin J. Murphy. “Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 109 (1994): 1125-1156.
- Hayes, Rachel, and Scott Schaefer. “Implicit Contracts and the Explanatory Power of Top Executive Compensation for Future Performance.” RAND Journal of Economics 31 (2000): 273-293.
- (C) Burtis, Andrew, and John Gabarro. “Brainard, Bennis & Farrell.” Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Case #9-485-037, 1996.
- (C) Stewart, James. “Taking the Dare.” The New Yorker (July 26, 1993): 34-39.
- (C) Roy, Donald. “Quota Restriction and Goldbricking in a Machine Shop.” American Journal of Sociology 57 (1952): 427-442.
- (H) Lazear, Edward, and Paul Oyer. “Personnel Economics.” In The Handbook of Organizational Economics . Edited by R. Gibbons and J. Roberts. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, forthcoming.
- *Waldman, Michael. “Job Assignment, Signaling, and Efficiency.” RAND Journal of Economics 15 (1984): 255-287.
- Brüderl, Josef, Andreas Diekmann, and Peter Preisendörfer. “Patterns of Intraorganizational Mobility: Tournament Models, Path Dependency, and Early Promotion Effects.” Social Science Research 20 (1991): 197-216.
- Chiappori, Pierre-André, Bernard Salanié, and Julie Valentin. “Early Starters versus Late Beginners.” Journal of Political Economy 107 (1999): 731-760.
- *Prendergast, Canice. “The Role of Promotion in Inducing Specific Human Capital Acquisition.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 108 (1993): 523-534.
- *Podolny, Joel, and James Baron. “Resources and Relationships: Social Networks and Mobility in the Workplace.” American Sociological Review 62 (1997): 673-693.
- Fernandez, Roberto, and Nancy Weinberg. “Sifting and Sorting: Personal Contacts and Hiring in a Retail Bank.” American Sociological Review 62 (1997): 883-902.
- Fernandez, Roberto, Emilio Castilla, and Paul Moore. “Social Capital at Work: Networks and Employment at a Phone Center.” American Journal of Sociology 105 (1999): 1288-1356.
- (C) Wiggenhorn, William. “Motorola U: When Training Becomes an Education.” Harvard Business Review (July-August 1990): 71-83.
- *Baker, George, Michael Gibbs, and Bengt Holmstrom. “The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 109 (1994): 881-919.
- *———. “The Wage Policy of a Firm.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 109 (1994): 921-955.
- Lluis, Stéphanie. “The Role of Comparative Advantage and Learning in Wage Dynamics and Intrafirm Mobility: Evidence from Germany.” Journal of Labor Economics 23 (2005): 725-767.
- (H) Waldman, Michael. “Theory and Evidence in Internal Labor Markets.” In The Handbook of Organizational Economics . Edited by R. Gibbons and J. Roberts. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, forthcoming.
- (C) Sonnenfeld, Jeffrey, and Meredith Lazo. “United Parcel Service (A) and (B).” Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Case #9-488-016 and -017, 1992.
- *Ichniowski, Casey, Kathryn Shaw, and Giovanna Prennushi. “The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity: A Study of Steel Finishing Lines.” American Economic Review 87 (1997): 291-313.
- *Baron, James, and Michael Hannan. “Organizational Blueprints for Success in High-Tech Start-Ups: Lessons from the Stanford Project on Emerging Companies.” California Management Review 44 (2002): 8-36.
- Milgrom, Paul, and John Roberts. “The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Technology, Strategy and Organization.” American Economic Review 80 (1990): 511-528.
- (H) Ichniowski, Casey, and Kathryn Shaw. “Insider Econometrics: A Roadmap to Estimating Empirical Models of Organizational Performance.” In The Handbook of Organizational Economics . Edited by R. Gibbons and J. Roberts. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, forthcoming.
- (H) Brynjolfsson, Erik, and Paul Milgrom. “Complementarity in Organizations.” In The Handbook of Organizational Economics . Edited by R. Gibbons and J. Roberts. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, forthcoming.
- (C) Fast, Norman, and Norman Berg. “The Lincoln Electric Company.” Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Case #376-028, 1975.
- (C) Brown, Claire, and Michael Reich. “When Does Union-Management Cooperation Work? A Look at NUMMI and GM-Van Nuys.” California Management Review (Summer 1989): 26-44.
- *Gibbons, Robert. “Team Theory, Garbage Cans, and Real Organizations: Some History and Prospects of Economic Research on Decision-Making in Organizations.” Industrial and Corporate Change 12, no. 4 (2003): 753-787 (sections 1-3).
- Marschak, Jacob, and Roy Radner. Economic Theory of Teams . New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1972. ISBN: 9780300012798.
- *Sah, Raj, and Joseph Stiglitz. “The Architecture of Economic Systems: Hierarchies and Polyarchies.” American Economic Review 76 (1986): 716-27.
- ———. “Organizational Structure as a Determinant of Performance: Evidence from Mutual Funds.” Unpublished manuscript, University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School, 2008.
- March, James, and Herbert Simon. Organizations . New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons, 1958. ISBN: 9780471567936.
- Cyert, Richard, and James March. A Behavioral Theory of the Firm . 2nd ed. New York, NY: Wiley-Blackwell, 1992. ISBN: 9780631174516.
- Cohen, Michael, James March, and Johan Olsen. “A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice.” Administrative Science Quarterly 17 (1972): 1-25.
- *Feldman, Martha, and James March. “Information in Organizations as Signal and Symbol.” Administrative Science Quarterly 26 (1981): 171-186.
- *Aghion, Philippe, and Jean Tirole. “Formal and Real Authority in Organizations.” Journal of Political Economy 105 (1997): 1-29.
- *Baker, George, Robert Gibbons, and Kevin J. Murphy. “Informal Authority in Organizations.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 15 (1999): 56-73.
- Rotemberg, Julio. “Power in Profit-Maximizing Organizations.” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 2 (1993): 165-198.
- Pfeffer, Jeffrey. “Sources of Power in Organizations.” Chapter 4 in Power in Organizations . Marshfield, MA: Pitman, 1981. ISBN: 9780273016397.
- (C) Aguilar, Francis, and Arvind Bhambri. “Johnson & Johnson (A), (B).” Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Case #384-053 and -054, 1983.
- (C) Foss, Nicolai. “Selective Intervention and Internal Hybrids: Interpreting and Learning from the Rise and Decline of the Oticon Spaghetti Organization.” Organization Science 14 (2003): 331-49.
- March, James. “The Business Firm as a Political Coalition.” Journal of Politics 24 (1962): 662-678.
- Skaperdas, Stergios. “Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights.” American Economic Review 82 (1992): 720-739.
- *Milgrom, Paul, and John Roberts. “An Economic Approach to Influence Activities in Organizations.” American Journal of Sociology 94 (1988): S154-S179.
- Rotemberg, Julio, and Garth Saloner. “Overt Interfunctional Conflict (and its Reduction through Business Strategy).” RAND Journal of Economics 26 (1995): 630-653.
- Prendergast, Canice. “A Theory of ‘Yes Men.’” American Economic Review 83 (1993): 757-770.
- Kramer, Roderick. “Organizational Paranoia: Origins and Dynamics.” Research in Organizational Behavior 23 (2001): 1-42.
- *Kreps, David. “Corporate Culture and Economic Theory.” In Perspectives on Positive Political Economy . Edited by J. Alt and K. Shepsle. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1990. ISBN: 9780521398510.
- *Colin, Camerer, and Roberto Weber. “Growing Organizational Culture in the Laboratory.” Chapter 96 in Handbook of Experimental Economics Results . Vol. 1. Edited by Charles R. Plott and Vernon L. Smith. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier, 2008. ISBN: 9780444826428.
- *Weber, Roberto. “Managing Growth to Achieve Efficient Coordination in Large Groups.” American Economic Review 96, no. 1 (2006): 114-126.
- O’Reilly, Charles, and Jennifer Chatman. “Culture as Social Control: Corporations, Cults, and Commitment.” In Research in Organizational Behavior: An Annual Series of Analytical Essays and Critical Reviews . Vol. 18. Edited by B. Staw and L. Cummings. New York, NY: Elsevier, 1999, pp. 157-200. ISBN: 9781559389389.
- (H) Camerer, Colin, and Roberto Weber. “Experimental Organizational Economics.” In The Handbook of Organizational Economics . Edited by R. Gibbons and J. Roberts. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, forthcoming.
- Jones, Stephen. “Worker Interdependence and Output: The Hawthorne Studies Reevaluated.” American Sociological Review 55 (1990): 176-190.
- Falk, Armin, and Andrea Ichino. “Clean Evidence on Peer Effects.” Journal of Labor Economics 24 (2005): 39-57.
- Mas, Alex, and Enrico Moretti. “Peers at Work.” American Economic Review 99, no. 1 (March 2009): 112-145.
- Charness, Gary, Luca Rigotti, and Aldo Rustichini. “Individual Behavior and Group Membership.” American Economic Review 97 (2007): 1340-1352.
- *Hermalin, Benjamin. “Toward an Economic Theory of Leadership: Leading By Example.” American Economic Review 88 (1998): 1188-1206.
- *Weber, R., Y. Rottenstreich, C. Camerer, and M. Knez. “The Illusion of Leadership: Misattribution of Cause in Coordination Games.” Organizational Science 12 (2001): 582-598.
- Zald, Mayer, and Michael Berger. “Social Movements in Organizations: Coup d’Etat, Insurgency, and Mass Movements.” American Journal of Sociology 83 (1978): 823-61.
- *Caillaud, Bernard, and Jean Tirole. “Consensus Building: How to Persuade a Group.” American Economic Review 97 (2007): 1877-1900.
- Brocas, Isabelle, and Juan Carrillo. “Influence Through Ignorance.” RAND Journal of Economics 38 (2007): 931-947.
- Rotemberg, Julio, and Garth Saloner. “Leadership Style and Incentives.” Management Science 39 (1993): 1299-1318.
- Van den Steen, Eric. “Organizational Beliefs and Managerial Vision.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 21 (2005): 256-283.
- (H) Hermalin, Benjamin. “Leadership and Corporate Culture.” In The Handbook of Organizational Economics . Edited by R. Gibbons and J. Roberts. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, forthcoming.
- Radner, Roy. “Hierarchy: The Economics of Managing.” Journal of Economic Literature 30 (1992): 1382-1415.
- ———. “The Organization of Decentralized Information Processing.” Econometrica 61 (1993): 1109-1146.
- Van Zandt, Timothy. “Real-Time Hierarchical Resource Allocation.” Unpublished manuscript, INSEAD, 2003.
- Calvo, Guillermo, and Stanislaw Wellisz. “Supervision, Loss of Control, and the Optimum Size of the Firm.” Journal of Political Economy 86, no. 5 (1978): 943-952.
- ———. “Hierarchy, Ability, and Income Distribution.” Journal of Political Economy 87, no. 5 (1979): 991-1010.
- *Garicano, Luis. “Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production.” Journal of Political Economy 108 (2000): 874-904.
- *Hart, Oliver, and John Moore. “On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization.” Journal of Political Economy 113 (2005): 675-702.
- (H) Garicano, Luis, and Timothy Van Zandt. “Hierarchies and the Division of Labor.” In The Handbook of Organizational Economics . Edited by R. Gibbons and J. Roberts. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, forthcoming.
- Miles, Raymond, and Charles Snow. “Causes of Failure in Network Organizations.” California Management Review 34 (1992): 53-72.
- Bartlett, Christopher, and Sumantra Ghoshal. “Beyond the M-Form: Toward a Managerial Theory of the Firm.” Strategic Management Journal 14 (1993): 23-46.
- (C) Freeland, Robert. “The Myth of the M-Form? Governance, Consent, and Organizational Change.” American Journal of Sociology 102 (1996): 483-526.
- (C) Holland, Philip, and Robert Eccles. “Jacobs Suchard: Reorganizing for 1992.” Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Case #9-489-106, 1989.
- (C) Bartlett, Christopher. “ABB’s Relays Business: Building and Managing a Global Matrix.” Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Case #9-394-016, 1993.
- Prendergast, Canice. “The Tenuous Trade-Off Between Risk and Incentives.” Journal of Political Economy 110 (2002): 1071-1102.
- Zábojnik, Ján. “Centralized and Decentralized Decision Making in Organizations.” Journal of Labor Economics 20 (2002): 1-22.
- Athey, Susan, and John Roberts. “Organizational Design: Decision Rights and Incentive Contracts.” American Economic Review 91 (2001): 200-205.
- Dessein, Wouter, Luis Garicano, and Robert Gertner. “Organizing for Synergies: Allocating Control to Manage the Coordination-Incentives Tradeoff.” Unpublished manuscript, Columbia University, 2008.
- Dessein, Wouter. “Authority and Communication in Organizations.” Review of Economic Studies 69 (2002): 811-38.
- *Alonso, Ricardo, Wouter Dessein, and Niko Matouschek. “When Does Coordination Require Centralization?” American Economic Review 98 (2008): 145-79.
- *Rantakari, Heikki. “Governing Adaptation.” Review of Economic Studies 75 (2008): 1257-85.
- *Baker, George. “Beatrice: A Study in the Creation and Destruction of Value.” Journal of Finance 47 (1992): 1081-1119.
- Schoar, Antoinette. “Effects of Corporate Diversification on Productivity.” Journal of Finance 57 (2002): 2379-2403.
- *Villalonga, Belén. “Diversification Discount or Premium? New Evidence from Business Information Tracking Series Establishment-Level Data.” Journal of Finance 59 (2004): 475-502.
- Mullainathan, Sendhil, and David Scharfstein. “Do Firm Boundaries Matter?” American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 91 (2001): 195-199.
- Gertner, Robert, David Scharfstein, and Jeremy Stein. “Internal Versus External Capital Markets.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 109 (1994): 1211-1230.
- Holmstrom, Bengt, and Jean Tirole. “Transfer Pricing and Organizational Form.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 7 (1991): 201-228.
- Richardson, George. “The Organisation of Industry.” Economic Journal 82 (1972): 883-896.
- Blois, K. “Vertical Quasi-Integration.” Journal of Industrial Economics 20 (1972): 253-272.
- Powell, Walter. “Neither Market Nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization.” Research in Organizational Behavior 12 (1990): 295-336.
- *Ménard, Claude. “On Clusters, Hybrids, and Other Strange Forms: The Case of the French Poultry Industry.” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 152 (1996): 154-183.
- *Robinson, David, and Toby Stuart. “Network Effects in the Governance of Strategic Alliances.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 23 (2007): 242-273.
- *Baker, George, Robert Gibbons, and Kevin J. Murphy. “Strategic Alliances: Bridges Between ‘Islands of Conscious Power.’” Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 22, no. 2 (June 2008): 146-163.
- (H) Ménard, Claude. “Hybrid Modes of Organization: Alliances, Joint Ventures, Networks, and Other ‘Strange’ Animals.” In The Handbook of Organizational Economics . Edited by R. Gibbons and J. Roberts. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, forthcoming.
- Holmstrom, Bengt, and Steven Kaplan. “The State of U.S. Corporate Governance: What’s Right and What’s Wrong?” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 15 (2003): 8-20.
Prerequisites & course information
Prereq: 14.124 G (Fall) 5-0-7 units
Sources
- Course catalogue ↗2026–2027
- MIT OpenCourseWare ↗Spring 2009
- MIT OCW syllabus ↗
- MIT OCW readings ↗
- MIT OCW calendar ↗
- Historical MIT OpenCourseWare offering. Named reading entries and schedule topics are automatically extracted from the linked source pages.