Introduction to Collective Choice and Political Economy

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Austen-Smith, David and Jeffrey S. Banks (2000). Positive Political Theory I: Collective Preference , University of Michigan Press. ISBN: 9780472087211.

Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini (2000). Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy , MIT Press. ISBN: 9780262161954.

Chapter 2: Preferences and Institutions

Chapter 3: Electoral Competition

Chapter 6: General-Interest Politics

Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson (2006). Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy , Cambridge University Press. ISBN: 9780521671422.

* Acemoglu, Daron, Suresh Naidu, Pascual Restrepo and James A. Robinson (2015). “Democracy, Redistribution, and Inequality”, Chapter 21 in Handbook of Income Distribution, Volume 2 , edited by Anthony B. Atkinson and François Bourguignon, Elsevier. ISBN: 9780444594303.

* Achen, Christopher H., and Larry M. Bartels (2016). Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government , Princeton University Press. ISBN: 9780691169446.

Bartels, Larry M. (2008). Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of a New Gilded Age , Princeton University Press.

Gilens, Martin (2012). Affluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in America , Princeton University Press. ISBN: 9780691153971.

Judis, John B. (2016). The Populist Explosion: How the Great Recession Transformed American and European Politics , Columbia Global Reports. ISBN: 9780997126440.

Dornbusch, Rudiger and Sebastian Edwards, ed. (1991). The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America , University of Chicago Press. ISBN: 9780226158440.

Cox, Gary W. (1997). Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World’s Electoral Systems , Cambridge University Press. ISBN: 9780521585279.

Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini (2003). The Economic Effects of Constitutions , MIT Press. ISBN: 9780262162197.

* Acemoglu, Daron (2009). Chapter 22 “Institutions, Political Economy, and Growth”, Introduction to Modern Economic Growth , Princeton University Press. ISBN: 9780691132921.

Olson, Mancur (1982). The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities , Yale University Press. ISBN: 9780300023077.

Shelling, Thomas C. (1981). The Strategy of Conflict , Harvard University Press. ISBN: 9780674840317.

Olson, Mancur Jr. (1971). The Logic of Collective Action , Harvard University Press. ISBN: 9780674537514.

Putnam, Robert D. (1994). Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy , Princeton University Press.

* Banerjee, Abhijit, Lakshmi Iyer and Rohini Somanathan (2008). “Public Action for Public Goods”, Chapter 49 in Handbook of Development Economics, Volume 4, edited by T. Paul Shultz and John A. Strauss. ISBN: 9780444531001.

Putnam, Robert D. (1994). Making Democracy Work: Civing Traditions in Modern Italy , Princeton University Press. ISBN: 9780691037387.

Tran, Anh (2011), “Which Regulations Reduce Corruption? Evidence from the Internal Records of a Bribe-Paying Firm”, mimeo.

* Banerjee, Abhijit, Rema Hanna and Sendhil Mullainathan (2012). “Corruption”, Chapter 27 in Handbook of Organizational Economics, edited by Robert Gibbons and John Roberts, Princeton University Press. ISBN: 9780691132792.

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Plunkitt, George Washington. (2014). Plunkitt of Tammany Hall: A Series of Very Plain Talks on Very Practical Politics . The Project Gutenberg, 2001. ISBN: 9781494885007.

Menes, Rebecca (2006). “Limiting the Reach of the Grabbing Hand: Graft and Growth in American Cities, 1880 to 1930”, Chapter 2 in Corruption and Reform: Lessons from America’s Economic History , edited by Edward L. Glaeser and Claudia Goldin, University of Chicago Press.