Game Theory and Political Theory
Introduces students to the rudiments of game theory within political science. Provides all students with the ability to solve simple games. Readings draw from basic texts on game theoretic modeling and applied articles in American Politics, International Relations, and Comparative Politics. Students taking the graduate version evaluate applied theory articles in the major journals.
Spring 2021 · Game Theory
This course introduces students to the rudiments of game theory as practiced in political science. It teaches students the basic elements of formal modeling and strategies for solving simple games. Readings draw from introductory texts on game theoretic modeling and applied articles in American politics, international relations, and comparative politics.
Readings
- [G] = Gibbons, Robert S. Game Theory for Applied Economists . Princeton University Press, 1992. ISBN: 9780691003955.
- [M] = Mas-Colell, Andreu, Michael D. Whinston, and Jerry R. Green. Microeconomic Theory . Oxford University Press, 1995. ISBN: 9780195073409.
- [MC] = McCarty, Nolan, and Adam Meirowitz. Political Game Theory: An Introduction . Cambridge University Press, 2007. ISBN: 9780521841078.
- Required Readings:
- Cameron, Charles M. “Rational Choice and the Presidency.” Chapter 3 in Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power. Cambridge University Press, 2000. ISBN: 9780521625500.
- Ignore the specific application to presidential vetoes; the method described (and defended) here is what this course prepares you to practice.
- [M] Chapter 1: Preference and Choice.
- [MC] Chapter 1: Introduction.
- Required Reading:
- Optional Readings:
- [MC] Chapter 5.1: The Normal Form.
- [MC] Chapter 5.2: Solutions to Normal Form Games.
- [MC] Chapter 5.6: Application: Interest Group Contributions.
- [G] Chapter 1.3.A: Mixed Strategies.
- [MC] Chapter 3.1: The Finite Case.
- [G] Chapter 2.1.A: Theory: Backwards Induction.
- [G] Chapter 2.1.B: Stackelberg Model of Duopoly.
- [G] Chapter 2.2.A: Theory: Subgame Perfection.
- [G] Chapter 2.2.B: Bank Runs.
- [G] Chapter 2.4: Dynamic Games of Complete but Imperfect Information
- Optional Reading:
- [G] Chapter 2.3.A: Two-Stage Repeated Games.
- [G] Chapter 2.3.B: Infinitely Repeated Games.
- [G] Chapter 3: Static Games of Incomplete Information.
- [G] Chapter 4.1: Introduction to Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
- [G] Chapter 4.2: Signaling Games.
- [G] Chapter 4.3A: Cheap-Talk Games.
- Bounded Rationality
- Algorithmic Game Theory
- Evolutionary Game Theory
- Agent-Based Modeling
Prerequisites & course information
Subject meets with 17.811 Prereq: Permission of instructor G (Spring) Not offered regularly; consult department 4-0-8 units
Sources
- Course catalogue ↗2026–2027
- MIT OpenCourseWare ↗Spring 2021
- MIT OCW calendar ↗
- MIT OCW syllabus ↗
- MIT OCW readings ↗
- Historical MIT OpenCourseWare offering. Named reading entries and schedule topics are automatically extracted from the linked source pages.