Moral Psychology

SES #: 3 · TOPICS: Belief/desire psychology and the Humean theory of motivation · READINGS: Smith, Michael. “The Humean Theory of Motivation.” Mind New Series 96, no. 381 (January 1987): 36-61.

Bratman, Michael. “Taking Plans Seriously.” Social Theory and Practice 9, nos. 2-3 (Summer-Fall 1983): 271-287.

Holton, Richard. “Intention.” Chapter 1 in Willing, Wanting, Waiting . New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009. ISBN: 9780199214570.

Bratman, Michael. “Intention and Means-End Reasoning.” The Philosophical Review 90, no. 2 (April 1981): 252-265.

———. “Two Faces of Intention.” The Philosophical Review 93, no. 3 (July 1984): 375-405.

———. Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987. ISBN: 9780674458185.

Velleman, David. “Review of Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason, by Michael Bratman.” The Philosophical Review 100, no. 2 (April 1991): 277-284.

Ridge, Michael. “Humean Intentions.” American Philosophical Quarterly 35, no. 2 (April 1998): 157-178.

Velleman, David. Practical Reflection . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989, chapter 4. ISBN: 9780691073378.

Langton, Rae. “Intention as Faith.” In Agency and Action . Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 55. Edited by John Hyman and Helen Steward. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2004, 243-258. ISBN: 9780521603560.

IV. Akrasia and weakness of will

6 · Akrasia · Davidson, Donald. “How is Weakness of Will Possible?” In Essays on Actions and Events . New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1980, pp. 21-42. ISBN: 9780198246374.

7 · Akrasia and desire

Watson, Gary. “Skepticism about Weakness of Will.” The Philosophical Review 86, no. 3 (July 1977): 316-339.

Humberstone, Lloyd. “Wanting, Getting, Having.” Philosophical Papers 19 (1990): 99-118.

Holton, Richard. “Intention and Weakness of Will.” Journal of Philosophy 96 (1999): 241-262.

Holton, Richard. “How is Strength of Will Possible?” In Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality . Edited by Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003. ISBN: 9780199257362.

Muraven, Mark, and Roy F. Baumeister. “Self-Regulation and Depletion of Limited Resources: Does Self-Control Resemble a Muscle?” Psychological Bulletin 126 (2000): 247-259.

Bratman, Michael E. “Planning and Temptation.” Chapter 3 In Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency . New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 35-57. ISBN: 9780521637275.

McClure, Samuel, David I. Laibson, George Loewenstein, and Jonathan D. Cohen. “Separate Neural Systems Value Immediate and Delayed Monetary Reward.” Science 306, no. 5695 (October 15, 2004): 503-507.

Ainslie, George, and John Monterosso. “A Marketplace in the Brain?” Science 306, no. 5695 (October 15, 2004): 421-423.

Kavka, G. “The Toxin Puzzle.” Analysis 43 (1983): 33-36.

Bratman, Michael E. “Toxin, Temptation and the Stability of Intention.” Chapter 4 in Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency . New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 58-90. ISBN: 9780521637275.

Broome, John. “Are Intentions Reasons? And How Should We Cope with Incommensurable Values?” In Practical Rationality and Preference: Essays for David Gauthier . Edited by Christopher Morris and Arthur Ripstein. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 98-120. ISBN: 9780521781848.

Holton, Richard. “Rational Resolve.” The Philosophical Review 113 (2004): 507-535.

Berridge, Kent C., and Terry E. Robinson. “The Mind of an Addicted Brain: Neural Sensitization of Wanting Versus Liking.” Current Directions in Psychological Science 4, no. 3 (June 1995): 71-75.

———. “Excusing Addiction.” Law and Philosophy 18, no. 6 (1999): 589-619.

Frankfurt, Harry G. “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.” The Journal of Philosophy 68, no. 1 (January 14, 1971): 5-20.

Watson, Gary. “Free Action and Free Will.” Mind New Series 96, no. 382 (April 1987): 145-172.

13 · Free will II · Frankfurt, Harry G. “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.” The Journal of Philosophy 66, no. 23 (December 4, 1969): 829-839.

14 · Free will IV: libertarianism · Kane, Robert. “Two Kinds of Incompatibilism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50, no. 2 (December 1989): 219-254.

Strawson, Peter F. “Freedom and Resentment.” Proceedings of the British Academy 48 (1961): 187-211.

Watson, Gary. “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme.” In Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology . Edited by Ferdinand Schoeman. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 256-286. ISBN: 9780521339513.

Wolf, Susan. “The Importance of Free Will.” Mind New Series 90, no. 359 (July 1981): 386-405.

Wegner, Daniel M., and T. Wheatley. “Apparent Mental Causation: Sources of the Experience of Will.” American Psychologist 54, no. 7 (July 1999): 480-492.

Wegner, Daniel M. “Précis of The Illusion of Conscious Will (and Commentaries and Reply).” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27, no. 5 (October 2004): 649-692.

Mele, Alfred R. “Free Will: Action Theory Meets Neuroscience.” In Intentionality, Deliberation and Autonomy . Edited by Christoph Lumer and Sandro Nannini. Routledge, 2016. ISBN: ‎9781138249288.

Frankfurt, Harry. “Identification and Wholeheartedness.” In The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays . New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 159-176. ISBN: 9780521336116.

———. “The Faintest Passion.” Chapter 8 in Necessity, Volition and Love . New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 95-107. ISBN: 9780521633956.

Ryan, R. M., and E. L. Deci. “Self-Determination Theory and the Facilitation of Intrinsic Motivation, Social Development, and Well-Being.” American Psychologist 55 (2000): 68-78.

Deci, E. L., and R. M. Ryan. “The ‘What’ and ‘Why’ of Goal Pursuits: Human Needs and the Self-Determination of Behavior.” Psychological Inquiry 11 (2000): 227-268.

Holton, Richard. “What is the Role of the Self in Self-Deception?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society New Series 101 (2001): 53-69.

Nichols, Shaun. “Norms with Feeling.” Cognition 84 (2002): 221-236.

Greene, Joshua D., Leigh E. Nystrom, Andrew D. Engell, John M. Darley, and Jonathan D. Cohen. “The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment.” Neuron 44 (2004): 389-400.

Kennett, Jeanette. “Autism and Empathy.” Philosophical Quarterly 52 (July 2002): 340-357.

Roskies, Adina. “Are Ethical Judgments Intrinsically Motivational? Lessons from Acquired Sociopathy.” Philosophical Psychology 16, no. 1 (March 2003): 51-66.

Cushman, Fiery. “Crime and Punishment: Distinguishing the Roles of Causal and Intentional Analyses in Moral Judgment.” Cognition 108, no. 2 (August 2008): 353-380.

Doris, John M. “Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics.” Noûs 32, no. 4 (December 1998): 504-530.

Bem, Daryl. “On the Uncommon Wisdom of our Lay Personality Theory.” Psychological Inquiry 3 (1992): 82-84.

Kamtekar, Rachana. “Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of our Character.” Ethics 114, no. 3 (2004): 458-491.

Vohs, Kathleen D., and Jonathan W. Schooler. “The Value of Believing in Free Will: Encouraging a Belief in Determinism Increases Cheating.” Psychological Science 19, no. 1 (January 2008): 49-54.

Baumeister, Roy F., E. J. Masicampo, and C. Nathan DeWall. “Prosocial Benefits of Feeling Free: Disbelief in Free Will Increases Aggression and Reduces Helpfulness.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 35, no. 2 (February 2009): 260-268.