Decisions, Games and Rational Choice
Foundations and philosophical applications of Bayesian decision theory, game theory and theory of collective choice. Why should degrees of belief be probabilities? Is it always rational to maximize expected utility? If so, why and what is its utility? What is a solution to a game? What does a game-theoretic solution concept such as Nash equilibrium say about how rational players will, or should, act in a game? How are the values and the actions of groups, institutions and societies related to the values and actions of the individuals that constitute them? Enrollment may be limited; preference to Course 24 majors and minors.
Spring 2008 · Decisions, Games, and Rational Choice
Foundations and philosophical applications of Bayesian decision theory, game theory and theory of collective choice. Why should degrees of belief be probabilities? Is it always rational to maximize expected utility? If so, why and what is its utility? What is a solution to a game? What does a game-theoretic solution concept such as Nash equilibrium say about how rational players will, or should, act in a game? How are the values and the actions of groups, institutions and societies related to the values and actions of the individuals that constitute them?
Readings
- Resnik, Michael. Choices: An Introduction to Decision Theory . Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1987. ISBN: 9780816614400.
- Jeffrey, Richard. The Logic of Decision . 2nd ed. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1990. ISBN: 9780226395821.
- Schelling, Thomas. The Strategy of Conflict . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008. ISBN: 9780674840317.
- Joyce, James M. The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory . Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999. ISBN: 9780521641647.
- Leyton-Brown, Kevin, and Yoav Shoham. Essentials of Game Theory: A Concise, Multidisciplinary Introduction . San Rafael, CA: Morgan and Claypool Publishers, 2008. ISBN: 9781598295931.
- SES #: 2-10 · TOPICS: Preference, ignorance and risk · READINGS: Resnik, chapters 1-3
- Resnik, chapter 4
- Sen, Amartya K. “Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of Economic Theory.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 6, no. 4 (Summer 1977): 317-344. Reprinted as chapter 4 in:
- Lewis, David. “Causal Decision Theory.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59, no. 1 (March 1981): 5-30.
- For those who want to explore causal decision theory in more depth, see Joyce, especially chapters 2-5.
- Resnik, chapter 5
- SES #: 20-26 · TOPICS: Defining social value in terms of individual value · READINGS: Resnik, chapter 6
- Sen, Amartya K. “Rationality and Social Choice.” The American Economic Review 85, no. 1 (March 1995): 1-24.
- Gibbard, Allan. “Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result.” Econometrica 41, no. 4 (July 1973): 587-601.
Prerequisites & course information
Prereq: One philosophy subject or permission of instructor U (Spring) 3-0-9 units. HASS-H
Sources
- Course catalogue ↗2026–2027
- MIT OpenCourseWare ↗Spring 2008
- MIT OCW syllabus ↗
- MIT OCW readings ↗
- Historical MIT OpenCourseWare offering. Named reading entries and schedule topics are automatically extracted from the linked source pages.