Logic II
The central results of modern logic: the completeness of predicate logic, recursive functions, the incompleteness of arithmetic, the unprovability of consistency, the indefinability of truth, Skolem-Löwenheim theorems, and nonstandard models. Enrollment may be limited.
Spring 2004
This course begins with an introduction to the theory of computability, then proceeds to a detailed study of its most illustrious result: Kurt Gödel's theorem that, for any system of true arithmetical statements we might propose as an axiomatic basis for proving truths of arithmetic, there will be some arithmetical statements that we can recognize as true even though they don't follow from the system of axioms. In my opinion, which is widely shared, this is the most important single result in the entire history of logic, important not only on its own right but for the many applications of the technique by which it's proved. We'll discuss some of these applications, among them: Church's theorem that there is no algorithm for deciding when a formula is valid in the predicate calculus; Tarski's theorem that the set of true sentence of a language isn't definable within that language; and Gödel's second incompleteness theorem, which says that no consistent system of axioms can prove its own consistency.
Prerequisites & course information
Prereq: 24.141 or permission of instructor U (Spring) 3-0-9 units. HASS-H
Sources
- Course catalogue ↗2026–2027
- MIT OpenCourseWare ↗Spring 2004
- MIT OCW syllabus ↗
- Historical MIT OpenCourseWare offering. Named reading entries and schedule topics are automatically extracted from the linked source pages.