Elections: Preference and Information Aggregation

Undergraduate

What is the purpose of voting and elections? This seminar-style course develops the perspective that voting, both in small (e.g., corporate boards) and large (e.g. national elections) scale, is usefully viewed as a mechanism through which individuals’ preferences and information are socially aggregated. We study different voting procedures from this point of view. We begin with the preference-aggregation approach known as social choice theory, tackling both practical issues and foundational results such as the Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility theorems. We then move on to the information-aggregation approach, discussing results such as the Condorcet jury theorems and addressing issues such as “roll off” voting in presidential elections. The course is geared around substantive questions but with an emphasis on logical and formal analysis. Prerequisites: ECON 2259 (or higher level), ECON 2121 , MATH 1100 , and MATH 1110 , or equivalents. SO T 9:25am-11:20am